Review
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BEZ VOINY. By *Vladimir Lavrinenkov.* Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1982. 272 pp. 1.10 rubles.

Students of postwar Soviet military policy will find in this memoir a rich source of material on a wide range of topics. Vladimir Dmitrievich Lavrinenkov was a much-decorated fighter pilot during the war, who went on to attend the Frunze Military Academy. In 1953 he entered the first class of the General Staff Academy ever to study the implications of nuclear weapons. He joined the Voiska PVO (air defense forces), commanded a fighter division, and in 1977 became deputy commander of civil defense in the Ukraine. His memoirs constitute a fascinating account of the development of Soviet military power in the postwar period. With the aid of ghostwriter (*literaturnaia zapis'*) Nikolai Belov, he has written this book—originally published in Ukrainian—in a lively style that provides a welcome relief from the tiresome prose of official Soviet histories and doctrinal writings. At the same time, the work does apparently draw on archival documents.

What is most remarkable about the memoir is how well it complements western and Soviet studies of the Soviet armed forces, while at the same time giving a fuller dimension to these accounts through revealing anecdotes and reminiscences. It is well known, for example, that Stalin imposed a censorship on discussion of matters related to nuclear weapons during his lifetime. Lavrinenkov now gives a personal account of the extent to which students at Soviet military academies chafed under such constraints: "We were studying conventional classical tactics, were weary from educational overload, mastering the knowledge of a combined-arms officer, yet not knowing to what extent it would be of use in our future service." Lavrinenkov gives personal testimony to the dominance of the ground forces in Stalinist military thought, a point also stressed in western accounts. Twice decorated as Hero of the Soviet Union for his flying during the war, Lavrinenkov, along with his fellow pilots, was afterwards forced to study army tactics and to don army uniforms to march in the May Day parades on Red Square. Following graduation, he was assigned the command of a rifle regiment and was not allowed to fly again until 1947. Despite his resentment, Lavrinenkov has nothing but fond memories of Stalin himself, as evinced for example by his description of a reception the generalissimo held for Soviet fighter pilots on his return from the Potsdam conference in 1945.

Lavrinenkov provides interesting details on the post-Stalin "revolution in military affairs" as well, including his role in the first atomic training of air units in the mid-1950s. He presents a harsh critique of the military policies of the Khrushchev period, especially of the "unilateral reductions" in Soviet forces and the lowered evaluation of fighter aircraft in favor of missiles. Students of Soviet civil-military relations will find much of interest here, as well as in Lavrinenkov's occasional discussions of conflict with the *politrabotniki* in his units. Lavrinenkov's account of dealing with intrusions of foreign aircraft into Soviet airspace provides revealing parallels to the Korean airliner incident of autumn 1983, especially regarding delegation of authority to shoot down unidentified planes.

In addition to the rich detail on many aspects of Soviet military life, Lavrinenkov's book provides some insight into the mentality of a Soviet officer. Although one of his favorite subjects at the Frunze Academy was English, Lavrinenkov's interest in the United States seems limited to its role as adversary. He finds a bright side to the U-2 incident of May 1960, because it shattered what he perceived as Soviet complacency in the face of United States military pressure. He praises the calls for greater Soviet military strength issued by Nikita Khrushchev's successors at the twenty-third and twenty-fourth party congresses. He ignores Leonid Brezhnev's "peace program" of 1971 and attributes United States willingness to negotiate subsequent arms-control treaties mainly to Soviet strength. For these perspectives on Soviet military power, but especially for the personal accounts of postwar developments, Lavrinenkov's book constitutes a rare and valuable source.

Students of Soviet security policy will be lucky if it represents a trend toward publication of many more such postwar military memoirs.

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THE DRAMA OF THE SOVIET 1960S: A LOST REFORM. By *Alexander Yanov.* Translated by *Stephen P. Dunn.* Research Series, no. 56. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984. xix, 141 pp. $8.50, paper.

Alexander Yanov probably completed his manuscript in late 1983. Prophetically, in the last paragraph of the text he notes that Mikhail Gorbachev who had promoted the link system in Stavropol' had been promoted to the Politburo in 1980 and placed in charge of agriculture. Yanov wonders if this might signal new life for the link reform. Our own research into the matter leads to an emphatic yes to such a question. But, both our research and Yanov's eyewitness account of the "lost reform" of the early 1960s raises serious questions as to whether Gorbachev can succeed where Nikita Khrushchev failed.

Surprisingly, Yanov's story starts in the early 1960s, totally ignoring the earlier battles over reorganizing agricultural workers into *zven'ia* (i.e., small teams or links). This omission, surely, is an important weakness in his otherwise superb study. Does he not know that, ironically, a decade earlier Khrushchev had been able to supplant Andrei Andreev as the party's point man in agriculture? At that time Andreev was championing the links, while Khrushchev argued, instead, for creating *agrogoroda* (agricultural cities in the countryside). This work, still, is a superb contribution to our understanding of the Soviet Union's major domestic economic problem.

In essence, the links of the 1960s and the links of the early 1980s promoted by Gorbachev as key to the collective contract (*kollektivnyi podriad*) scheme, involve a total reorganization of the work and, thus, of economic relationships on the farms. Where instituted, the links are small groups of peasants (often from the same family) who are given control over their own actions on that portion of the farm enterprise for which they are responsible. Under the terms of the arrangement, if the link members improve productivity or reduce costs, they are rewarded directly by increased incomes. This policy stands in stark contrast to the long-standing permanent brigade system (i.e., brigades of more than one hundred individuals) wherein piecework dominates, and individual contribution is so diluted that the ordinary peasant has no incentive to work harder or more frugally. All is documented by Yanov, including some important new material this reviewer had not previously encountered.

During the campaign for the reform in the early 1960s, Yanov was a political writer whose major responsibility was to provide on-the-scene reports from the farms. He became convinced that the universal adoption of the link reform was the solution to the Soviet agricultural problem. As he points out, under the brigade piecework system on many farms, as many as 40 percent of the workers were engaged as overseers responsible for checking on every aspect of their colleagues' work. Again, when the relatively inflated incomes of the farm officials and the specialists are accounted for in the statistics on average farm incomes, the "horse-and-hand workers" who make up "two thirds of rural society [earn] no more than 25 percent of the minimum necessary for survival from work on the kolkhoz" (p. 10). It is no wonder the private plots continue to thrive.

Neither this researcher nor Yanov has been able to find a single direct word of praise for the *zveno* by Khrushchev. Yanov, however, does make a convincing case that the scheme complemented Khrushchev's ill-fated plans for agricultural reform. The reform was totally compatible with Khrushchev's declaration in 1961 that "the facelessness of the