How the 'end of the Cold War' ended, in Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order, Gunther Hellman and Benjamin Herborth, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

12 How the 'End of the Cold War' Ended

Matthew Evangelista

In December 1992, then Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev made a speech in Stockholm that came as a great shock to his audience. He appeared before a meeting of the Conference (now Organization) for Security and Cooperation in Europe to criticize the policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as 'essentially unchanged' from the days of the Cold War. He mentioned NATO's 'military presence in the Baltic and other regions of the territory of the former Soviet Union' and its interference 'in Bosnia and the internal affairs of Yugoslavia'. Furthermore, he indicated that the CSCE should not expect its norms to apply fully in the space of the former Soviet Union, which Kozyrev called 'a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests using all available means, including military and economic ones'. He called for a reconstitution of the former Soviet republics into a new federation or confederation.[1]

Kozyrev waited an hour to return to the rostrum and explain that his speech was just a rhetorical device – others came to call it 'shock diplomacy'. Kozyrev said he intended his speech to depict the views of nationalist opponents of post-Soviet Russia's President Boris Yeltsin. The conservative *New York Times* columnist William Safire described it as the speech of 'the next Russian foreign minister – the one who might represent a government that has brushed aside Boris Yeltsin and the democratic reformers' (Safire, 1992).

1 What the End of the Cold War Meant

Even among experts there is disagreement on when to date the end of the Cold War, with some observers wanting to equate it with the end of the Soviet Union (Evangelista, 2015a). If so, Kozyrev's speech came within a year of that event. Even those who would want to place the end of the Cold War somewhat earlier – say, sometime between the beginning of

[1] Kozyrev's text is available at http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=50C87303010D3.

Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and the fall of the Berlin Wall – would still have seen the 'post–Cold War' honeymoon period last no more than half a dozen years, if Kozyrev's speech had been real.

Had Kozyrev's speech been real, he would in effect have announced the end of the 'end of the Cold War' – what many heralded as a new post–Cold War normative order. And what, for him, would have been the explanation for the end of that short-lived order? He cited *material* factors – or at least the expectation of material factors – including NATO's military presence on former Soviet territory and interference in the internal affairs of ex-Yugoslavia. And this was more than a year before NATO intervened militarily in Bosnia in February 1994; seven years before it launched its first war against Serbia in defense of the separatist republic of Kosovo in March 1999; seven years before it took on new members from the former Warsaw Pact – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary; and twelve years before NATO expanded into the Baltic region, the focus of Kozyrev's prescient remarks. Material factors cannot explain anything in international politics without reference to how they are perceived and acted upon by states – or, more accurately, representatives of states. Kozyrev claimed that Russia's leaders interpreted NATO's behavior as indicating that the alliance's motives had remained 'essentially unchanged', despite the end of the Cold War, and he suggested that Russia would act accordingly.

Some weeks after dropping his Stockholm bomb, Kozyrev was invited to elaborate on his views for the *NATO Review.* At the time, Kozyrev was widely viewed as a proponent of Russia's integration into the international system dominated by the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, in his choice of words he adopted the conventional dichotomy that at a discursive level already seems to preclude that integration. When he writes, for example, that 'Russia is, of course, interested in the further development of cooperation with the West', he implies that Russia's identity is distinct from the West. It can cooperate with the West, it can end the Cold War conflict with the West, but it cannot become part of the West (Kozyrev, 1993). At other points, he implies that Russia does indeed want to become part of the West, or, as he puts it, to 'join the club of recognized democratic states with market economies, on a basis of equality'. Kozyrev favors the 'renewal of Russia and its transition to a civilized condition' – interestingly, he seems to equate 'civilization' with the West – but he acknowledges that it will be 'no easy task' (ibid.).

So even at the height of post–Cold War optimism, one of Russia's most Western-oriented government officials revealed a certain ambivalence about his uses of the West. By maintaining the dichotomy 'Russia vs. the West', he alluded to the difficulties posed by the goal of 'civilizing' Russia

into a Western identity. The best he could do was to try to shore up the political phenomenon, the normative order that I call the 'end of the Cold War'. That order came increasingly under strain during the first years of the new millennium and was especially threatened during the summer of 2008. The subsequent election of Barack Obama as US president led to expectations of some improvement in Russia's relations with the West, but few expected a revival of the optimism of the early 1990s. For most observers the violent conflict in Ukraine starting in 2014, and Russia's annexation of Crimea, marked the definitive end of the 'end of the Cold War' order. Yet, as this chapter argues, the end had been in sight already for many years.

In this chapter, I pose the question of what ended the 'end of the Cold War' as a period that seemed to herald a new normative order, and, at a minimum, a de-securitization of relations between Russia and the West. De-securitization in its most straightforward sense means that former rivals, who viewed their relationship mainly in terms of military threats, engage in a process that reduces the salience of threat as a defining characteristic of the relationship. In the case of Russia and the NATO alliance, if that process did indeed begin to reverse itself by the turn of the millennium, what might explain what we could call 're-securitization'? I consider first the material changes that realists might adduce to explain re-securitization: expansion of the NATO alliance to Russia's borders, proposed deployment of elements of a ballistic-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and NATO's war against Serbia and subsequent recognition of the secession of Kosovo.

I then turn briefly to explanations for how the Cold War ended and suggest that despite the tenacity of some realist accounts, a focus on material factors alone fails to explain the de-securitization of East-West relations at a time when the Soviet Union still deployed massive military power, including tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. The mutual perception of threat between East and West effectively evaporated, even as the weapons that ostensibly constituted that threat remained largely in place and were only gradually reduced thereafter. As with the process of securitization itself, what constructivists call the intersubjective understandings of the Cold War rivals changed – in this case from enmity to near amity – before the material manifestations of the change fully emerged.[2] I then consider how this intersubjective element figures in the developments of the late 1990s and beyond. I suggest that we confront a problem of potential theoretical inconsistency. In particular, I

[2] On the relationship between securitization and the emerging military competition, see Buzan et al., 1998, esp. pp. 56–59.

wonder whether we can reconcile a non-realist explanation for the end of the Cold War with a recognition that, within a decade, factors such as NATO expansion and encirclement of Russia were already contributing to a deterioration in relations and the prospect of re-securitization if not full return to a Cold War.

First, let me define what two things I mean to say by the 'end of the Cold War'. The first one I have suggested already – 'the end of the Cold War' as a new, post–Cold War normative order. That order entailed a de-securitization of relations between the United States and its NATO allies on the one hand, and post-Soviet Russia, on the other. We witnessed a transformation in intersubjective understanding. Countries that used to recognize each other as enemies no longer considered themselves enemies, but came up with new names, like 'partners'. Practical, material manifestations of this new intersubjective understanding appeared – things that realists would acknowledge, namely vast reductions in the levels of conventional military forces stationed in central Europe, for example. Additionally, Russia and the United States reduced their nuclear weapons and stopped pointing them at each other, or so they claimed.

In the economic domain, the United States claimed to have a stake in Russian economic (and political) stability, and began providing economic aid through the international financial institutions it dominated. In the energy sector, European officials proposed an Energy Charter that would include the members of the rival blocs. Fifty-two countries, including every European country except Serbia and all of the former republics of the USSR including Russia, became members of the Energy Charter Conference by signing a political declaration at The Hague in December 1991. As the Charter's official website proclaims, the conference took place 'at a time when the end of the Cold War offered an unprecedented opportunity to overcome previous economic divisions'. Reflecting aspirations for the new post–Cold War normative order, the Energy Charter Treaty that followed in 1994 declared as its 'fundamental aim' to 'strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and trade'.[3] As with those in the security realm, these economic aspirations were soon disappointed, as price and supply of energy became one of the most contentious issues in Russia's relations with its Western neighbors.

[3] See the official website, http://www.encharter.org/. I thank Jens van Scherpenberg for calling my attention to the importance of the Energy Charter in this context, and for other helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

The second meaning of the 'end of the Cold War' refers to the way political scientists and others explain how the Cold War itself ended. One cannot claim that there is a consensus on this matter, as there is still a lot of disagreement on the specifics of how the Cold War ended. What one can claim, however, is that the most simplistic explanations, themselves extremes along the spectrum from exclusively material to exclusively ideational accounts, are generally understood to be inadequate. This is not a very strong claim, as simplistic accounts are inadequate by definition. But we can use our common acknowledgment of the limits of explanations that rely solely on material factors or solely on ideas (this common acknowledgment, something like a scholarly consensus, is my second meaning of 'the end of the Cold War') as a way to understand what happened to the normative order that we thought was emerging over the course of many years (my first meaning of 'the end of the Cold War'). In other words, let us see whether we can use what we have learned in studying the end of the Cold War to shed light on the possible return to Cold War or the emerging post-post-Cold War period.

2 Explaining the End of the Cold War

To explain the end of the Cold War we can start by reviewing the extreme – or perhaps we could call them 'ideal-type' – explanations for the end of the Cold War, the ones we agree are inadequate. On the materialist side, we have explanations that focus on US President Ronald Reagan's military buildup and Soviet economic decline, sometimes linked to each other. However, we find these explanations inadequate for many reasons. Throughout the Reagan years, the Soviet Union retained its most potent weapons – nuclear and conventional – and always had the ability to destroy the United States in the mutual suicide pact that constituted the nuclear arms race (Chernoff, 1991; Knopf, 2004). The Soviet economy was stagnating, but the most serious damage came with Gorbachev's ill-conceived efforts to revive it. He could have muddled through. Indeed, we expect that almost any other Soviet leader – here we conduct a counterfactual thought experiment – would have reacted differently than Gorbachev.[4] Gorbachev's values led him to be sceptical of the predominant role that security concerns played in Soviet policy; he wanted to reform the economy not primarily to make the country militarily more capable – the so-called breathing space argument. He

[4] See the essays in Herrmann and Lebow, 2004, especially Chapter 7 by George W. Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow, 'Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment'.

intended to end the arms race and reorient resources to provide for the material well-being of ordinary people, and he wanted the Soviet Union to be accepted by the West as a normal, civilized country – the same goal that Kozyrev, as post-Soviet Russia's foreign minister, articulated. This is how Gorbachev and his reformist allies used 'the West' – to represent the norm for a state that treated its citizens decently at home and engaged in cooperative relations with other states. The corrective to the extreme, materialist-realist version of the end of the Cold War requires an understanding of these uses of the West by Soviet reformers (English, 2000). In this account, 'the West' became the judge of whether the Soviet reforms had gone far enough to transform its image as an enemy. From the other side, no less a representative of the 'peace through strength' approach, President Ronald Reagan eventually sought to use the West not to threaten the Soviet Union but to reassure it: 'I had come to realize there were people in the Kremlin who had a genuine fear of the United States. I wanted to convince Gorbachev that we wanted peace and they had nothing to fear from us' (Reagan 1990, pp. 12, 545–723). Using the West in this way, Ronald Reagan revealed his own understanding of the limits of a materialist-realist explanation that emphasized economic decline and military power. Perceptions of threat from the Other figured in Reagan's newfound insight into the sources of Cold War conflict. Reducing the perception of threat from the West through a process of de-securitization contributed to ending the Cold War.

Yet there are also problems with explanations favored by constructivists that focus mainly on changes in intersubjective understandings resulting from a decline in threat perception. The ideal-type idealist-constructivist version of the end of the Cold War is perhaps best represented by the important 1994 article by Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil. They use the end of the Cold War as an empirical case to illustrate constructivist arguments about the relationship between agents and structures. They argue

> that in all politics, domestic and international, actors reproduce or alter systems through their actions. Any given international system does not exist because of immutable structures, but rather the very structures are dependent for their reproduction on the practices of the actors. Fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction. Moreover, reproduction of the practice of international actors (i.e., states) depends on the reproduction of practices of domestic actors (i.e., individuals and groups). Therefore, fundamental changes in international politics occur when beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered[,] thereby also altering the rules and norms that are constitutive of their political practices. (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994, p. 216)

For Koslowski and Kratochwil, the change in beliefs and identities of domestic actors took place first in the Soviet bloc, with the rise of civil society and the decline in legitimacy of the Communist Party. They analogize this process to the rise of nationalism in eighteenth-century France, the development of the *levée en masse*, and the subsequent transformation of the international system in Europe.

What is their evidence for the transformation of the international system that accompanied the end of the Cold War? They could have cited the obvious factors that realists would recognize: the end of the military standoff in central Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself, the unification of Germany, and the end of communist rule. But to their credit they went beyond these material changes. Instead, they identify the underlying *norms* that constitute the new order and argue that both sides' views of that order converged on a common understanding. For the Soviet Union, they argue, the acceptance of a united Germany as part of NATO signaled Soviet recognition that 'such a solution was likely to serve Soviet security interests better than a neutral Germany'. Moreover, 'Western multilateral institutions also had solved the problem of prosperity', so that Soviet leaders came to consider 'the maintenance and development of the European multilateral institutions preferable to weakening them' (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994, p. 245). Koslowski and Kratochwil see Soviet leaders undergoing ideational change to come to new understandings based on a consequentialist logic: the new international system serves the interests of security and prosperity better than the old one. For Koslowski and Kratochwil, the Soviet leaders are using the West not only as the judge of the bona fides of their reform efforts, but effectively as the ultimate goal of those efforts: they want the Soviet Union to become part of the West, to become part of the Western multilateral system as the basis for a new post–Cold War order.

Koslowski and Kratochwil argue that the United States also came to accept this post–Cold War order that would allow Russia to 'join the club', in Kozyrev's words, 'on a basis of equality'. Their main source of evidence consists of the decision by the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush (the first President Bush) not to take advantage of Soviet weakness and to maintain a US commitment to multilateralism in the governance of international affairs. Secretary of State James Baker promised his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze that NATO would be transformed from a military alliance to a political organization, and Shevardnadze also thought he received a commitment that NATO would not expand beyond the inclusion of the former German Democratic Republic (East

Germany).[5] As evidence of continued US adherence to multilateralism, the authors mention in particular the repudiation by the first President Bush of the Pentagon's 'Defense Planning Guidance' document, leaked to the press in March 1992. The draft document claimed that the United States should 'prevent the emergence of a new rival' by maintaining a level of military superiority adequate to discourage any 'potential competitors' (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994, p. 221). For Koslowski and Kratochwil the rejection of this document signaled US acceptance of a new normative order that brought its erstwhile enemy into the system of multilateralism that constituted the West.

With hindsight, the rejection of the Defense Guidance document and Baker's commitment to Shevardnadze appear as inadequate evidence to represent US acceptance of a new normative order. We know now that the United States did not feel itself bound to end the expansion of NATO or diminish its military role. We know that the second George Bush appointed the authors of the 1992 Defense Guidance document to high-level positions in his administration and tried to implement their unilateralist vision, by withdrawing from various treaty commitments and by invading Iraq.

Perhaps an early indication of the divergent views between the United States and its allies, on one side, and Russia, on the other, came with the interpretation of the end of the Cold War itself. Many Americans, in particular, were prone to speak in terms of a US 'victory' in the Cold War – sometimes entirely leaving out the role of European allies, and usually understating the role of Gorbachev and his reforms. Some North American scholars have, however, challenged the triumphalism of the US victory narrative, and, in doing so, reflect a view closer to the common Russian one. In reference to the opportunity costs of decades of military confrontation and the risks that crises over Cuba and the Middle East could have erupted into nuclear war, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1994), for example, called their book on those crises *We All Lost the Cold War*. It appeared with the following endorsement from Mikhail Gorbachev (whose knowledge of English was too limited for him actually to have read the book): 'They've got it just right. It is a dangerous conclusion that the West won the Cold War. The argument that one side won the Cold War is mistaken. We all lost the Cold War, particularly the USA and the USSR. We all won by ending it. That is the scientific conclusion'. Gorbachev repeated his assertion in June 2004, when he attended the funeral of Ronald Reagan, in response to the widespread

[5] The actual story is more complicated, as explained by Kramer, 2009.

claim that Reagan's policies had led to a US victory in the Cold War. 'That's not serious', Gorbachev said, using the same words several times. 'I think we all lost the Cold War, particularly the Soviet Union. We each lost $10 trillion', he said, referring to the money Russians and Americans spent on an arms race that lasted more than four decades. 'We only won when the Cold War ended' (Kaiser, 2004). This has remained the prevailing view in Russia. As Sergei Karaganov, a scholar who supported Gorbachev's reformist approach in the 1980s, recalled at the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 2009, 'the US regarded itself as the victor in the cold war, but Russia does not regard itself as the loser. At the very least we expected an honorable peace' (Erlanger, 2009).

3 Failure of the New Order

Russian commitment to the new normative order faltered in the face of US actions that seemed to violate Moscow's understanding of how the Cold War ended. In Russian eyes, the post–Cold War settlement did not constitute an 'honorable peace'. We know, in particular, that post-Soviet leaders in Russia came to resent NATO's relentless expansion eastward. NATO enlargement, then Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev told an international audience in Evian, France, in October 2008, 'objectively contradicts the national security interests of Russia, and a nervous reaction follows immediately. How can we understand this otherwise?' (Medvedev, 2008). From the late 1990s into the new millennium, as NATO continued to add new members, Russia's leaders protested, yet never quite drew a line in the sand. But, with the 'nervous reaction' of the August 2008 invasion of Georgia, the Russian government sent a signal: further NATO enlargement to include a country that Russia had already attacked would render questionable the central commitment behind the NATO alliance – to respond as if an attack against one member were an attack against all. In September 2008, Republican vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin was obliged to address this issue when an ABC TV interviewer asked her whether the United States might have to go to war if Russia again invaded Georgia, once it had become a NATO member. She replied: 'Perhaps so. I mean, that is the agreement when you are a NATO ally, is [*sic*] if another country is attacked, you're going to be expected to be called upon and help'.[6] Palin was ridiculed in the US for this answer, and much else, but it happens to be the correct one, the

[6] For a transcript of the interview of 11 September 2008: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/Story?id=5782924&page=1.

one that conforms to US obligations in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[7]

Russia's leaders also had problems with other manifestations of US unilateralism besides NATO expansion, such as the withdrawal from the treaty banning anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But Russia engaged in its own unilateral actions, including in the economic realm, in ways that are inconsistent with Koslowski and Kratochwil's expectations of intersubjective agreement on a new order founded on a certain understanding of the West. They anticipated that the transformed normative order – what I am calling the 'end of the Cold War order' – would see Russia's embrace of multilateral institutions in Europe as a source of prosperity as well as security. The European Energy Charter is a case in point. Instead, we saw Russia risk spoiling its relations with the European Union by wielding its control over oil and gas resources as a coercive tool against its neighbors.

Even in the security realm, we observed Russia's uneasy relationship with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a rejection of the application of its norms to the conflict in Chechnya, for example, or to relations with the countries of the 'near abroad', the successor states of the Soviet Union – much as Kozyrev predicted in December 1992. Russia's rejection of the normative order has had material consequences as well. In July 2007, for example, President Vladimir Putin announced a suspension of Russia's obligations under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe – a reaction, in turn, to NATO's undermining of the normative order by expanding the alliance eastward, with its own material consequences of new military deployments on the Russian border.[8] In 2008 Russia fought a war with Georgia, and in 2014 Russian forces – despite official denials – began engaging in 'hybrid warfare' in Ukraine.

So why did predictions of a new, post–Cold War order – one characterized by de-securitization and multilateralism rather than militarized great-power rivalry – fail to anticipate the aggressive unilateralism of the Bush administration or the elements of neo-imperialism in post-Soviet Russia? One answer is that '9/11 changed everything' – that the benign security environment anticipated with the end of the Cold War exploded with the attacks of al Qaeda. In my view, however, that is the wrong answer. The challenge of transnational terrorism actually offered as many, or more, opportunities for multilateral cooperation as for rivalry.

[7] For the text: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

[8] Andrew Kramer and Thom Shanker, 'Russia Steps Back from Key Arms Treaty', *New York Times*, 14 July 2007.

In fact, this is an area that has seen considerable cooperation between Russia and NATO. What we need to explain, it seems to me, is why relations have not fulfilled the promise that constructivists such as Koslowski and Kratochwil expected, despite the common commitment to deal with the threat of terrorism. It is worth mentioning that the expectations of realists, such as John Mearsheimer, have not been fully met either. They anticipated the demise of the NATO alliance as the Soviet threat disappeared and a gradual tendency of countries to balance against the United States as the sole superpower. But the most realists have been able to find is evidence of what they call 'soft balancing' – and even that evidence is not particularly compelling.[9] Russia itself did not evince an intention to engage in balancing either – yet it could play the role of a potential 'spoiler' by disrupting the hegemonic plans of the US-led alliance and creating disorder.[10]

The simplest version of my argument is this: With the end of the Cold War, the US government and the NATO alliance stopped paying attention to Russia. Russian leaders, resenting the lack of attention, still chose to interpret much of what the United States and NATO did as directed against Russia. This interpretation echoes Andrei Kozyrev's words that NATO policy stayed 'essentially unchanged', that NATO remained an anti-Russian alliance, dominated by the United States – except that, I argue, the anti-Russian consequences of NATO policy were mostly unintended, and primarily the result of domestic pressures in the United States.

Let me focus on three of the developments that Russia claimed to find most troubling: the expansion of NATO; the military intervention in Serbia and subsequent support for independence of the separatist province of Kosovo; and renunciation of the ABM Treaty and the plan – subsequently revised – to deploy components of a ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. I argue that all of these US initiatives stemmed from domestic political considerations and were not directed against Russia. US policy makers neglected to take Russian interests into account, and when they were obliged to do so, they chose to ignore or dismiss evidence of serious Russian concern.

James Goldgeier and others have argued convincingly that the expansion of the NATO alliance emerged from domestic political considerations during the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton. Clinton faced pressure from East European diaspora communities in the

[9] Mearsheimer, 1990; on soft balancing, see, among others, Pape, 2005, and Lieber and Alexander, 2005.

[10] I thank Harald Mueller for this point, made long before the crisis in Ukraine.

United States articulating the wishes of prominent foreign politicians, such as Václav Havel of the Czech Republic and Lech Wałęsa of Poland, who both advocated their countries' inclusion into NATO. For them NATO symbolized the security and prosperity of the West. To the extent that any theory of international politics guided Clinton's decision, it was the theory of the Democratic Peace, which holds that democracies do not go to war against each other (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 21). Enlarging the community of democracies, from this perspective, seemed a sound idea. However, most other theories argued against it. Realism would not predict or prescribe the expansion of an alliance in the absence of a threat. As Robert Jervis (1995) pointed out in an interesting counterfactual musing, if NATO had never been created in the wake of World War II, no one would have advocated *creating* it at the end of the Cold War, let alone expanding it. Other critics of NATO expansion pointed to the potential countermeasures that Russia threatened – refusal to sign the treaty on strategic nuclear arms (START II), withdrawal from the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and formation of a counter-alliance among former Soviet republics (Evangelista, 1995). Within the Clinton administration, an early sceptic was Deputy Secretary of State and former Clinton roommate Strobe Talbott – a long-time specialist on Russia. He expressed particular concern about the impact on Russia's fragile democracy, although he later came to promote the policy of expansion (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 36–37). Writing later, in the wake of the second wave of NATO enlargement, Robert Jervis (2005, pp. 4–5) declared, in regard to the opponents of that policy, that 'we were wrong, or at least our expectations about the effect on Russia were not borne out'.

This claim concedes too much. Consider, for example, this prediction from 1995: 'In the end, supporters of Russian democracy are likely to be hurt most by any NATO march eastward, since their insistence on the West's generally benign intentions will meet with widespread scepticism' (Evangelista, 1995). I still think this was a pretty good prediction, and not only because it was mine. The point is that the foreign-policy initiatives of one state get interpreted through the filter of the domestic politics of the other. In this case, we have to ask whether other factors were hurting the supporters of Russian democracy aside from US and NATO behavior, and I am confident that we would answer affirmatively. Western economic intervention in post-Soviet Russia, for example, made ordinary Russians associate democracy with economic decline, corruption, and crime (Wedel, 2001). My main point, for the purposes of this argument, is that what NATO leaders thought they were doing – their own self-perception – was very different from what a substantial, and growing, section of the Russian policy community thought they were doing.

My second example is the ABM Treaty and deployments. This is a reasonably straightforward story. Ballistic-missile defense is primarily about US domestic politics, and, especially, the politics of the Republican Party. In the 1990s, it became a litmus test of Republican candidates for office to support withdrawal from the treaty and deployment of defense systems.[11] The only Republican congressional representative who came out against pursuit of these systems – and this should tell us something – was someone trained as a physicist: he knew they would not work.[12] The Bush Administration came into office in 2001 determined to deploy a defense system, whether it worked or not. But as the system failed one rigged test after another and the end of Bush's second term loomed in sight, the Bush people became desperate that they had nothing to show for all these years of rhetoric on an issue so dear to the core Republican constituency. They came up with the idea of deploying some high-profile components in Eastern Europe, justifying them as part of a system to defend against an attack from Iran. Russian officials expressed concern about the system and doubts about the rationale, and they offered instead to pursue some kind of joint system relying on existing Russian components, such as radars. The Bush administration officials feigned interest, but the cooperative proposal did not serve their political objectives – which were predominantly domestic.

The Russian public interpretation of these US actions held that they were directed against Russia and, in President Putin's words, would 'upset the balance' of nuclear forces. Russian analysts suggested the new deployments were intended to neutralize Russia's capability to launch a retaliatory nuclear attack against Europe if Russia faced a nuclear attack from the West. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dismissed these concerns as 'ludicrous'. In fact, the proposed deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland were not well suited for their stated mission of defending Europe from an Iranian attack; if upgraded, they would be more effective in hindering a Russian missile attack. In response to the announcement of US deployment plans, Putin proposed to the Bush administration more cooperative means of dealing with a potential Iranian threat, including sharing data from Russian radar systems and even joint operation of early-warning centers in Moscow and Brussels (Lewis and Postol, 2007). However, the Bush administration preferred its own plan. That the US deployment was suboptimal from a security standpoint reinforces the sense that domestic politics was the main motivating

[11] On this point, see Kaplan, 2008, especially chapter 3, 'Chasing Silver Bullets'.

[12] Vernon Ehlers of Michigan voted against Bill HR 4 to declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense, vote number 1999-4, 18 March 1999. See http://www.ontheissues.org/MI/Vernon_Ehlers_Homeland_Security.htm.

force. Because the Democratic administration that succeeded Bush was not beholden to a constituency that insisted on deployment of missile defenses, it was able to reverse the Republican decision – or, at least, substitute one more plausible from a security standpoint and less threatening to the Russians.[13]

The third example, NATO's war against Serbia in March 1999 and subsequent recognition of Kosovo's independence, has been a major irritant in Russia's relations with the West. The US motivation for promoting NATO's attack against Serbia represented a reaction to the situation on the ground – and the failure of European states to resolve the conflicts in former Yugoslavia – but it clearly had domestic origins as well. In particular, the Clinton administration had come under criticism for years from human rights groups for ignoring the actions of Slobodan Milošević's forces as they carried out brutal ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and laid siege to its capital Sarajevo. When the United States finally intervened with air strikes, the critics argued that it was too little and too late. The Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia mainly ratified the results of the violence carried out by Serb and Croat troops. Further criticism was leveled at the Clinton administration for ignoring the genocide in Rwanda. Stung by such criticism, US officials were primed to redeem themselves and remained alert to the next case of wide-scale ethnic atrocities. Thus, when Serb violence against Kosovar Albanians escalated during 1998, Clinton and his advisers were ready to summon the allies to respond with force. How such action would be perceived in Russia was hardly uppermost in their minds.

Yet both Russia and China, in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council, opposed NATO military action in 1999 and resisted recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. The reasons are not hard to fathom: Both states were facing secessionist challenges to their own rule – in Chechnya and in Tibet, respectively – and did not want to see the precedent set for military intervention, however justified on humanitarian grounds, without explicit Security Council approval (which they in turn could block with their vetoes). Russia's worst-case scenario would see the dismemberment of Serbia as providing a blueprint for similar action against itself. This is particularly ironic, given the extent to which the United States – under Republican and Democratic administrations – has been willing to look the other way as Russia employed indiscriminate military force to keep Chechnya from seceding (Evangelista, 2008). The breakup of the Russian Federation has not been a high priority for US policy makers, despite Russian fears.

[13] US domestic economic interests are also relevant to the policy change. See Tiron, 2009.

The combination of the three issues we have discussed has nevertheless made some Russian officials fear the worst: their country being encircled by NATO military bases, with ballistic missile defense systems preventing Russian retaliation against NATO military intervention aimed at disintegration of the Russian Federation. The last straw for these officials was US provision of military aid and training to the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia at a time when its president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was intent on taking back disputed separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force, if necessary. Again, the support of Georgia's territorial integrity against Russian encroachment was not the main motive for US military aid: the Bush administration trained the Georgian troops for deployment in the deserts of Iraq, grateful for Georgian participation in the dwindling coalition of the willing. In fact, Georgia's was the third-largest contingent in Iraq after the US and Britain (Deutsche Welle news analysis, 2008). There is no doubt that many US officials saw the training and equipping of Georgia's forces as a step on the way to eventual NATO membership – even if they themselves did not view that goal as directed against Russia. Yet Russian leaders perceived the US action as part of a pattern of anti-Russian activities, stretching over more than a decade.

When confronted with arguments about such Russian perceptions, US officials have rejected them, as we saw with Secretary Rice's dismissal of concerns about missile deployments. Responding to a September 2008 article that put Russia's invasion of Georgia into the context of years of complaints about NATO expansion, another State Department official went further. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried insisted that 'NATO membership for Western European countries during the cold war brought peace to nations that had known centuries of war. NATO membership for Central and Eastern Europe after the cold war extended this peace. Indeed, NATO enlargement, and EU enlargement that followed it, were leading factors in making the region to Russia's west the most stable and nonthreatening it has been in Russia's history'. He added that he didn't 'expect Russia will thank us for this act, but it should'.[14]

4 Power and Identity in Russia's Relations with the West

The leading schools of thought in the study of international relations have not prepared us very well for understanding such divergent perspectives on the normative order that has followed the end of the Cold War. Realist-inflected concepts that take account of the possibility of

[14] Fried, 2008. The original article was Friedman, 2008.

misperception, such as the security dilemma, anticipate that each side will perceive threats from the other side, while viewing its own motives as benign and defensive. Yet what would security-dilemma theorists say about a situation where one side (Russia) claims to feel threatened over the course of many years, while the other side (the United States and NATO Europe) is not only oblivious to the threat it poses (an expectation from the security dilemma), but feels no reciprocal threat from the first side? It is noteworthy that only since August 2008 have prominent US political figures spoken explicitly about Russian aggression – and much more loudly since Russia's military intervention in Ukraine began in 2014 – but even here they do not adduce a direct threat to the United States itself. Some US officials, such as Vice President Joseph Biden, instead highlighted Russia's weakness (Spiegel, 2009). Implementing economic sanctions as a response to Russian intervention also implies belief in the inherent weakness of Russia's economy, if it is to be vulnerable to such measures.

Most variants of constructivism also prepare us poorly to understand this state of affairs – Russia acting besieged, the West seeming oblivious. For constructivists, interstate relations and normative orders are founded on intersubjective understandings. Either both sides understand each other as enemies or they understand each other as friends. For the constructivist research agenda, the interesting question, as Koslowski and Kratochwil pose it, for example, is how the system moves from one set of intersubjective understandings to another. But what we have seen is something quite different. One side (Russia) claimed that it was facing a potentially dangerous enemy in the form of an expanding NATO alliance, whereas the other side claimed that it was treating Russia well. The United States, in its understanding, established a zone of peace right up to the Russian border – Russia should 'thank us for this act', in the US official's words – yet Russia interpreted the same actions as threatening.

How can we explain this state of affairs? When faced with the inadequacy of systemic-level theories, whether realist or constructivist, one response is to look to domestic politics. In judging ostensibly material factors, such as external threats or internal economic conditions, there is much scope for disagreement among domestic political coalitions, based on their divergent interests and values (Snyder, 1989; Evangelista, 1993). One version of how the Cold War ended focuses on the transnational coalitions that formed across state borders among supporters of moderation on each side. Opponents of militarization tried to persuade their governments to act in such a way as to bolster the position of the opponents of militarization on the other side (Evangelista, 1999). But in the case in question, we did not observe the level of internal debate that existed

even during the Cold War – on either side. Support for NATO expansion received bipartisan support in the United States, with even erstwhile members of peace movements buying into the Democratic Peace argument. On the Russian side, as Andrei Kozyrev predicted in 1992, and as many others observed a few years later, democrats who supported a Western-oriented policy became increasingly squeezed out of the policy realm. Aleksei Arbatov, who played an influential role in military reform during the Gorbachev years, lost his parliamentary seat as the liberals dropped off the political spectrum and their parties failed to gain the minimum percentage votes for representation. On both sides, the scope for internal disagreement appears to have narrowed. That may mean a correspondingly reduced role for domestic politics in determining the nature of the international normative order.

The reduced role for domestic politics in explaining the foreign policies of Western democracies suggests a paradox. On the one hand, it seems to be a defining feature of Western liberal democracies to open up domestic sites of contestation in their foreign policies; on the other hand, the notion of a strongly integrated Western community of values seems to blur the hard and fast line between domestic and international politics within that Western community.[15] How, then, might Russia be expected to view the West, given this paradoxical relationship between ostensible support for plurality of opinion, on the one hand, and unity of values, on the other? In what follows, I consider this question as I seek to explain why what I call the 'end of the Cold War' international order failed to sustain itself and what might come next.

I suggest two possible, and possibly complementary, explanations. The first explanation brings relative power back into the equation in a way that realists would find congenial. They might argue that Russia has felt threatened simply because its position had so weakened since the disintegration of the Soviet Union when faced with the unprecedented power of the United States. As the sole superpower, the United States did not need to think about Russia or even have a 'Russia policy', yet Russia still needed to concern itself about US actions such as support for NATO expansion and military intervention in its neighborhood. How do we explain why it took so long for Russia's reaction to US and NATO policies to make any impression on the West? Was Russia speaking too quietly, or was the West simply not listening?

Evidence has emerged from Wikileaks that in 2008 – some months before Russia's war with Georgia – the US ambassador to Moscow got the message that NATO expansion was alarming the Russian leadership.

[15] I owe this point, and indeed this specific formulation, to Benjamin Herborth.

Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

That Ambassador William Burns took Russia's concerns seriously is without doubt. He made sure that his point would not be missed by giving this title to his memo: "Nyet Means Nyet: Russia's NATO Enlargement Redlines."[16] Yet Washington was clearly not listening.

Here again, the factor of power might play some role in explaining the course of events. This explanation would suggest that Russia was simply too weak and preoccupied with internal economic and political disarray to respond any sooner, except with verbal complaints. Later, however, bolstered by windfall energy profits, having consolidated domestic authority, and having damped down the conflict in restive Chechnya, Russia was in a position to assert itself. By 2008 it could draw a new line in the sand: no NATO expansion into Georgia or Ukraine, no new missiles in Poland or radars in the Czech Republic without a suitable military response, and goodbye to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, one of the clearest material manifestations of the end of military dimension of the Cold War.

The second explanation for why Russia failed to find a modus vivendi with the West is more consistent with a constructivist approach, but one that gives pride of place to the domestic context and the role of identity than to intersubjective understandings at the systemic level. During the liminal period between the Cold War and the order that followed, Russia faced the prospect of identity creation, much as the Soviet Union had done in the wake of Iosif Stalin's death (Hopf, 2000). The 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a striking disjuncture between Russia's emerging self-identity and how the United States understood the country. The US self-identity as world leader precluded Russia's identity as an equal great power. As Ted Hopf has pointed out,

[16] "Nyet Means Nyet: Russia's NATO Enlargement Redlines," Memorandum of Ambassador William J. Burns, 1 February 2008, originally classified "confidential," and sent, among others, to the US secretaries of defense and state, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US National Security Council, NATO, and the European Union, available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08MOSCOW265.html.

the dominant discursive formation in the 'identity landscape' of Russia in the late 1990s was inclined to view the United States as a threat, in part because of US violation of the norms of sovereignty and multilateralism, which were important in constituting Russia's identity as a great power (ibid., ch. 5). The dominant US discourse on the country's identity, by contrast, assumed a 'leadership' role and took for granted that the United States was a force for good in the world (Leffler and Legro, 2008). However anachronistic the practice seemed, the mainstream press continued throughout the post–Cold War period to refer to the United States and its president as 'the leader of the free world'.[17]

Whether because of power differentials or divergence of identities, the basis for a common vision of a normative order between 'the West' and Russia in the two decades following the Cold War seemed very slim. Domestic politics, civil society, and transnational relations played less of a role in influencing the nature of the post–Cold War international order than they played in ending the Cold War itself.

5 Domestic Politics and the Potentially Plural West

The potential – but still limited – significance of domestic politics becomes apparent when we consider how the change in US administrations from Republican to Democratic in January 2009 affected the West's relations with Russia and how the crisis in Ukraine influenced politics within the United States and NATO. The Obama administration came into office fostering the impression that it was ready to depart from its predecessor's unilateral and conflictual approach to foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with then Russian President Medvedev in March 2009 and presented him with a big plastic button with 'reset' printed at the bottom, and *peregruzka* at the top. Using computer jargon, the Obama administration intended the button to symbolize the US intention to reset or re-boot US-Russian relations with the goal of improving them. Critics quickly pointed out a certain insensitivity in putting the Russian translation of 'reset' in Latin rather than Cyrillic script, not to mention a certain incompetence in translation: Clinton's advisers mistakenly put the Russian word for 'overload' (*peregruzka*) in place of the one for 're-boot' (*perezagruzka*). President Medvedev graciously declined to highlight the error, but it nevertheless took on a certain symbolic significance. It suggested the lack of interest in Russia on the part of US officials, which I identified as part of the

[17] See, for example, Ash, 2008. *The Economist* did the same in its editorial endorsing Obama in the US presidential election: 'It's Time', *The Economist*, 30 October 2008.

explanation for how the 'end of the Cold War' ended. Put simply: were there really no Russian dictionaries or Cyrillic typefaces available to the US State Department? Even the displacement of Cyrillic characters by the alphabet of the West can be seen to represent the encroachment of the West on the East. In former Yugoslavia, for example, the Latin script has literally been displacing Cyrillic, especially in areas no longer under Serbian influence. Elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc, erstwhile allies and even former constituent members of the USSR – notably Georgia – emphasize English as the second language in their schools rather than Russian. In any event, obliviousness to Russia's concerns appeared to be a solid bipartisan element of US foreign policy.

If cultural encirclement were not enough to trouble the Russians, it is combined with the more traditional military type – again the product of a bipartisan consensus in the United States, apparently shared by the NATO allies in the community of Western values. The Obama administration continued its predecessor's policy in training and arming Georgian troops – this time for deployment to Afghanistan rather than Iraq, but to the equal dismay of the Russians. In June 2009, US officials met with a Georgian delegation under the auspices of the new U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed by the Bush administration in January 2009, just as it was leaving office, and interpreted by some as 'a surrogate guarantee of fast-track NATO membership' for Georgia. A week later, Russian forces demonstrably carried out military exercises in the region (Radio Free Europe, 2009; Shanker, 2009; Schwirtz, 2009).

The clearest manifestation of Russia's rejection of the 'end of the Cold War' normative order came in its reaction to the events in Ukraine. In November 2013, the Ukrainian government, under President Viktor Yanukovych, rejected an Association Agreement with the European Union that its supporters had posed as a 'civilizational choice' for Ukraine – a rather instrumental 'use' of 'the West.' Yanukovych was more influenced by practical economic concerns. His corrupt rule had contributed to Ukraine's economic stagnation, but the EU agreement and promise of involvement by the International Monetary Fund did not seem like a solution. Free trade in the short term would be disastrous for the eastern and southern regions of the country, with their uncompetitive, Soviet-era industries and their connections to the Russian military-industrial sector. The IMF was known for promoting painful austerity measures. At the same time Russia was offering a choice of carrots or sticks – to purchase Ukrainian debt and provide subsidized gas, if Ukraine would reject the EU agreement, or raise gas prices to world-market rates and call in its loans if it accepted. Yanukovych made his choice and the pro-Europe opposition forces mounted massive

demonstrations in protest at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev. Yanukovych reacted with brutal violence, directed mainly at students protesting peacefully. Later the protestors organized into self-defense forces, led prominently by extremist groups such as *Svoboda* (Freedom) and *Pravyi Sektor* (Right Sector), brandishing their fascist and nationalist symbols, such as the *Wolfsangel* used by the Waffen SS. They attacked the police and sought to storm government buildings by force, resulting in the deaths of numerous police officers and protesters.

In the midst of the crisis, US officials crudely sought to influence the outcome and bring to power the Ukrainian politicians they most favored. The recording of a telephone conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pyatt, US Ambassador to Ukraine, appeared on YouTube, apparently after it was intercepted by Russian secret services (Markus, 2014). Putin had already convinced himself that the 'colored revolutions' – the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 that brought a pro-US politician to office, and the Orange Revolution that reversed a rigged election and led Yanukovych to cede power in 2004 – were Western plots. He made the same claim about the mass protests against his own return to power in Moscow in 2012. To hear Nuland and Pyatt discuss which Ukrainian politicians should be in the government and which should remain on the outside could only reinforce his fears. The leaked conversation reveals that Nuland was orchestrating a telephone call from Vice President Joseph Biden to Ukrainian opposition leaders and a visit from United Nations officials. That she was excluding the European Union from her plans ('F*** the EU' is the quote that attracted most attention from the media) may have reassured Putin, but it also encouraged him to pursue policies to exploit a divided West.

On 21 February 2014, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland brokered a deal between Yanukovych and opposition leaders that promised an end to the violence and a commitment to early presidential elections. Many protesters were dissatisfied with the agreement, and armed *Pravyi Sektor* and *Svoboda* militants issued an ultimatum for Yanukovych to resign, threatened members of parliament from the eastern and southern regions, and vandalized their offices. Many of the politicians fled for their lives. Yanukovych himself escaped Kiev the next day, and then was formally removed from office by the rump parliament, which then – in violation of the 21 February agreement – moved elections up to 25 May. Facing charges that its actions were unconstitutional, the parliament then dismissed five judges of the Constitutional Court. On 23 February, the new parliament passed a resolution revoking the 2012 language law that allowed the use of Russian and other minority languages

for official business in regions where minority speakers represented at least 10 percent of the population. Under international pressure and in the wake of protests in Crimea and southern and eastern Ukraine, acting President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the measure four days later. But the damage was done and the stage was set for Russian armed intervention and subversion in support of separatist movements.[18]

Armed conflict in Ukraine, pitting Russia against its erstwhile 'partners' in Europe and the United States, put the final nail in the coffin of the post–Cold War normative order. Ironically, the crisis at the same time breathed new life into domestic and alliance politics. Whereas the expansion of NATO occasioned little debate in the United States, the imposition of sanctions against Russia and proposals to arm and train Ukrainian government and irregular 'national guard' forces generated considerable controversy. Prominent realist scholars, such as John Mearsheimer (2014) and Stephen Walt (2015), invoked 'security dilemma' arguments to explain Russia's behavior; cautioned against measures that would escalate the crisis; and advocated negotiating a new security order that would guarantee Ukraine's neutrality, regardless of the wishes of its citizens. A number of retired US diplomats and Russia specialists, including former ambassadors to Moscow, adopted a similar stance (e.g., Matlock, 2014). Within the alliance some disagreements emerged about how forcefully to respond to Russian intervention, with the so-called *Russlandversteher* (Russia understanders) coming under criticism as latter-day appeasers.

Years before the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, then Russian President Medvedev, expressing dissatisfaction with the 'end of the Cold War' normative order, had called for a new European security architecture to supersede the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and, presumably NATO as well.[19] With the United States oblivious to Russian interests and the effect of its policies on Russian threat perceptions, the prospects for negotiating a new order barely received a hearing. If any order emerges out of the chaos in Ukraine, it will be nothing like the short-lived and chimerical 'end of the Cold War' one. That order was premised on a unity of values in the West and a consensual Russian desire to embrace a Western identity. Both elements were already in doubt when Andrei Kozyrev practiced shock diplomacy with his late 1992 speech. More relevant for the subsequent course of events than a unity of values was the disproportionate power wielded by the United States and its NATO allies. As for Russia's Western identity, it was embraced

[18] For more discussion of the background to the crisis, see Evangelista, 2015b.

[19] Soloviev, 2009; ITAR-TASS, 23 June 2009; Kuznetsova, 2009. For analyses of the Russian proposals, see Makarychev, 2009, and Giusti, 2009.

by only some Russians – and a diminishing number at that – who found it hard to embrace or identify with a West that kept throwing its weight around and acting in disregard of any plausible Russian concerns.

Paradoxically, the conditions that might contribute to a stable post-post–Cold War normative order are a relatively stronger Russia – if not to balance the United States and Europe, then at least to get them to pay attention – and a rejection of the quest for common identities. As Russians come to recognize the genuine diversity of identities represented by the idea of the West, they might be willing to give expression to their own range of identities, until now suppressed in the interest of meeting the challenge of a seemingly monolithic West. Here a final paradox reveals itself: By its effort to get the West's attention with military intervention in Ukraine, Russia provoked a response – however controversial and irresolute – that is likely to hinder the growth of its future power. Russia has neither the material strength nor an alternative ideology coherent or attractive enough to sustain a Cold War of the sort that divided the world for four decades. We cannot speak of a 'new Cold War' in that sense. Yet Russia certainly maintains the wherewithal to continue playing the role of spoiler and at least slow the triumphal march of the idea of the West.

REFERENCES

Ash, Jim (2008) 'Obama Faces High Hopes but Skeptical Electorate,' *Ithaca Journal* (Gannett News Service), 13 November.

Breslauer, George W. and Richard Ned Lebow (2004) 'Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment', in Richard K. Hermann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds., *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 161–188.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).

Chernoff, Fred (1991), 'Ending the Cold War: The Impact of the US Military Buildup on the Soviet Retreat', *International Affairs* 67, 1, pp. 111–126.

Deutsche Welle news analysis (2008) 'Georgian Army May Be Tough Nut for Russia to Crack', 8 September.

English, Robert D. (2000) *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Erlanger, Steven (2009) 'The Legacy of 1989 Is Still Up for Debate', *New York Times*, 8 November.

Evangelista, Matthew (1993) 'Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 154–178.

(1995) 'Why Russia Opposes Expansion: NATO Stay Away from My Door', *The Nation*, 5 June.
(1999) *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
(2008) 'The Chechen Conflict at 18: Historical and International Perspectives', in *Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali*, no. 8, October.
(2015a) 'Explaining the Cold War's End: Process Tracing All the Way Down?', in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
(2015b) 'Crisi Ucraina, tra cause e possibili soluzioni' (The Ukrainian Crisis, between Causes and Possible Solutions), *Vita e Pensiero* (Milan), no. 1, January-February.
Fried, Daniel (2008) 'Georgia, the US, and the Balance of Power: An Exchange', *New York Review of Books*, 23 October 7.
Friedman, George (2008) 'Georgia and the Balance of Power', *New York Review of Books*, 25 September.
Giusti, Serena (2009) 'La sicurezza dall'Atlantico agli Urali secondo la Russia', ISPI – Policy Brief n. 114, January, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_114_2009.pdf.
Goldgeier, James (1999) *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press).
Herrmann, Richard K. and Richard Ned Lebow, eds. (2004) *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
Hopf, Ted (2000) *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
ITAR-TASS (2009) 'Russian Foreign Minister Sums Up Vienna Talks on European Security Pact', 23 June.
Jervis, Robert (1995) 'Legacies of the Cold War', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 2, 2, pp. 21–28.
(2005) *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge).
Kaiser, Robert G. (2004) 'Gorbachev: "We All Lost Cold War"', *Washington Post*, 11 June.
Kaplan, Fred (2008) *Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons).
Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2004) 'Did Reagan Win the Cold War?', *Strategic Insights*, 3, 8 (August).
Koslowski, Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1994) 'Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System', *International Organization*, 48, 2, pp. 215–247.
Kozyrev, Andrei (1993) 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance,' NATO Review, no. 1 (February 1993), pp. 3–6, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9301-1.htm.
Kramer, Andrew and Thom Shanker (2007) 'Russia Steps Back from Key Arms Treaty', *New York Times*, 14 July.

Kramer, Mark (2009) 'The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia', *Washington Quarterly*, 32, 2, pp. 39–61.
Kuznetsova, Ekaterina (2009) 'Russia No Match for NATO', *Moscow Times*, 9 July.
Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein (1994) *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Leffler, Melvyn and Jeffrey Legro, eds. (2008) *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press).
Lewis, George N. and Theodore A. Postol (2007) 'European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns', *Arms Control Today*, October.
Lieber, Keir A. and Gerard Alexander (2005) 'Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back', *International Security*, 30, 1, pp. 109–139.
Makarychev, Andrey S. (2009) 'Russia and Its "New Security Architecture" in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept', Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document No. 310, Brussels, February 2009.
Markedonov, Sergey (2009) *The Big Caucasus: Consequences of the 'Five Day War', Threats, and Political Prospects*, Xenophon Paper No, 7, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Athens, Greece, May.
Markus, Jonathan (2014) 'Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call'. BBC Europe, 7 February.
Matlock, Jack F. (2014) 'Who Is the Bully? The U.S. Has Treated Russia Like a Loser since the End of the Cold War,' *Washington Post*, 14 March.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15, 4, pp. 5–56.
(2014) 'Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin', *Foreign Affairs* (September–October).
Medvedev, Dmitrii (2008) 'Vystuplenie na Konferentsii po mirovoi politike' (Speech to the World Policy Conference), 8 October, Evian, France, http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207422.shtml.
Pape, Robert A. (2005) 'Soft Balancing against the United States', *International Security*, 30, 1, pp. 7–45.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2009) 'US, Georgia Report Progress in First Talks of Strategic Partnership', 23 June, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Georgia_Report_Progress_In_First_Talks_Of_Strategic_Partnership/1760513.html.
Reagan, Ronald (1990) *An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster).
Safire, William (1992) 'Kozyrev's Wake-up Slap', *New York Times*, 17 December.
Schwirtz, Michael (2009) 'Russia Begins War Games Near Georgia', *New York Times*, 30 June.
Shanker, Thom (2009) 'US to Resume Training Georgian Troops', *New York Times*, 13 August.
Snyder, Jack (1989) 'International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change', *World Politics*, 42, pp. 1–30.
Soloviev, Vladimir (2009) 'New Security System Having Problems in the OSCE', *Kommersant*, 24 June.
Spiegel, Peter (2009) 'Biden Says Weakened Russia Will Bend to US', *Wall Street Journal*, 29 July.

Tiron, Roxanna (2009) 'Missile Defense Shift Redirects Billions in Government Contracts', *The Hill*, 20 September.
Walt, Stephen M. (2015) 'Why Arming Ukraine Is a Really, Really Bad Idea', *Foreign Policy*, 9 February.
Wedel, Janine (2001) *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave.