Rough-and-Tumble World: Men Writing about Gender and War

By Matthew Evangelista

War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. By Joshua S. Goldstein. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 523 pages. $40.00 cloth.

A few years ago, I was preparing to teach a big introductory course in international relations, and I wanted to include feminist perspectives and scholarly works by women. About half of my students were women, and I tried to make sure they knew that the field was open to them if they wanted to pursue international studies. I also sought to engage the students by linking theories of international relations to current events, some of which—the debate over women in combat in the U.S. armed forces, for instance, or the widespread use of rape as a strategy of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan wars—brought the question of gender to the fore. Fortunately, *Foreign Affairs* had just published a reader designed to introduce students of international relations to current policy debates. Unfortunately, it included not a single woman author—creating an



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inaccurate picture of both the academic study and the real-world practice of international relations, at a time when the U.S. secretary of state, for example, was both a woman and a former professor of international politics.

In the reader's second edition, the editors remedied the situation, in their fashion—not by including any women authors, but by adding an article, originally published in *Foreign Affairs,* called "Women and the Evolution of World Politics."[1] Francis Fukuyama, its author, was a public intellectual well known for his contributions to other high-profile debates, but not yet this one. Drawing upon a cursory reading of the literature in primatology, Fukuyama argues that human males, like their chimpanzee cousins, are by nature aggressive. He suggests that "there is something to the contention of many feminists" (unspecified) who maintain that "aggression, violence, war, and intense competition for dominance in a status hierarchy are more closely associated with men than women." He parts company with "the feminist view" that such behaviors are "wholly the products of a patriarchal culture," because "in fact it appears they are rooted in biology." Moreover, the prospects for resocializing men to be less violent—what he takes to be the feminist agenda—are dubious: "What is bred in the bone cannot be altered easily by changes in culture and ideology."[2]

Fukuyama's wide-ranging article raises a number of provocative points. He claims that the "feminization" of politics in developed democracies, by which he means the "expansion of female franchise and participation in political decision-making," helps explain what political scientists call the "democratic peace": the observation that countries that consider themselves democracies rarely fight countries they perceive as kindred democracies. This is a fascinating hypothesis, well worth an article in itself, but Fukuyama provides no evidence for it. In fact, his claim that "developed democracies tend to be more feminized than authoritarian states" and, for that reason, more peaceful does not seem to be supported by data on, for example, the proportion of women in national parliaments. By Fukuyama's measure of "feminization," Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Rwanda rank at 6, 12, 16, and 22, respectively, with the United States at 59, Ireland at 60, and France at 65.[3] Moreover, the democratic-peace literature shows that democracies are actually quite bellicose when confronting nondemocracies, a finding inconsistent with Fukuyama's feminization hypothesis. Fukuyama is worried that feminized democracies will fail to stand up to aggressive, masculine challengers: "In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability."[4]

The logic of Fukuyama's argument is familiar to students of international relations who have encountered it in the form of simple game-theoretic models of arms races, among other places. If every country reliably disarmed, the argument goes, the world would be at peace. But for fear that one country might threaten the peace by secretly arming, every country must retain weapons for its own security, thereby rendering a peaceful, disarmed world impossible. Fukuyama's fear of feminization is thus a variant of the traditional concern about the danger of disarmament, reflected in the so-called security dilemma. Fukuyama adds a further demographic twist: while the populations of democratic Europe and Japan will soon be dominated by elderly women, "a much larger and poorer part of the world will consist of states in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia with young, growing populations, led mostly by younger men."[5] For the rich democracies to face the threat of poor, male-dominated challengers, "masculine policies will still be required, though not necessarily masculine [i.e., male] leaders."[6]

I ended up assigning the second edition of the *Foreign Affairs* reader, somewhat reluctantly, but was pleasantly surprised at the high quality of class discussion that *faux*-feminist Fukuyama's article stimulated. The students also read works by genuine feminist scholars of international relations, such as Cynthia Enloe, J. Ann Tickner, and Christine Sylvester. For the core text of the course, I relied on an excellent survey of the field by Joshua Goldstein. Currently in its fifth edition, his *International Relations*[7] is rare among IR textbooks for the serious attention it gives to gender and to feminist approaches.

Now Goldstein has produced a major work devoted to the relationship between gender and war. Not intentionally (the book was years in the making), he addresses many of the issues raised by Fukuyama. *War and Gender* has something of a textbook feel to it, in the best sense: it is tightly organized, clearly written, and extensive in its coverage, with wonderfully apt photos and illustrations. It is profoundly interdisciplinary, delving into genetics, anthropology, primatology, and psychology, among other fields, in search of answers to a puzzle that political science as a discipline has tended to neglect. Goldstein has strong credentials for undertaking this sort of inquiry. For example, he worked and published in the field of molecular pharmacology as a high school student. He has a knack for synthesizing diverse literatures and relating their findings to the question at hand.

The Puzzle: Warfare as Mainly Male

The puzzle at the core of *War and Gender,* as Goldstein formulates it, is straightforward: "why warfare is virtually an all-male occupation" (169). He organizes his inquiry on the basis of six hypotheses and 19 sub-hypotheses, covering such explanations as testosterone levels, childhood gender segregation, women's peace activism, and men's economic domination of women (see Table 1). Sorting through such a range is a task only a polymath could love, but Goldstein is clearly up to it. He treats all of the hypotheses seriously and evaluates the evidence judiciously.

In characteristic fashion, Goldstein uses his first hypothesis to question the validity of the very generalization that underlies his puzzle: Are gender-linked war roles really consistent across cultures, time, and space? What about the mythical Amazons, women warriors depicted for millennia in literature and art? What about the peaceful agrarian societies, the precapitalist matriarchies that Friedrich Engels and others described? Sifting through the archaeological and anthropological evidence, Goldstein determines that although the mythical Amazons reveal a great deal about the culture and attitudes of the ancient Greeks and the Spanish conquistadors—who, among others, wrote about fierce women warriors—they do not represent genuine counterexamples of women engaging in armed conflict. He finds little evidence that "humans started out more peaceful in simple

Table 1
Summary of hypotheses

The consistency of gendered war roles across cultures might be explained by:

1. Gender-linked war roles are not in fact cross-culturally consistent.
2. Sexist discrimination despite women's historical success as combatants:
   a. In female combat units
   b. In mixed-gender units
   c. As individual women fighters
   d. As women military leaders
3. Gender differences in anatomy and physiology
   a. Genetics
   b. Testosterone levels
   c. Size and strength
   d. Brains and cognition
   e. Female sex hormones
4. Innate gender differences in group dynamics
   a. Male bonding
   b. Ability to work in hierarchies
   c. In-group/out-group psychology
   d. Childhood gender segregation
5. Cultural construction of tough men and tender women
   a. Test of manhood as a motivation to fight
   b. Feminine reinforcement of soldiers' masculinity
   c. Women's peace activism
6. Men's sexual and economic domination of women
   a. Male sexuality as a cause of aggression
   b. Feminization of enemies as symbolic domination
   c. Dependence on exploiting women's labor

Source: *War and Gender,* 4.

societies and became more warlike in complex societies, culminating in modern states" (24).

Goldstein does find two notable exceptions to the rule of warfare as a mainly male endeavor: The first is the kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa. It lasted from 1625 to 1892 and "revolved around war totally," as its "economy was based on conquering neighboring peoples to sell as slaves to European traders (who, in turn, completed the cycle by selling guns and other military supplies to the Dahomey)" (22). One branch of the standing army was made up entirely of women, sometimes constituting up to a third of the country's armed forces. Even though exceptional, the example is important to contemporary debates about women in the military because "it shows the possibility of an effective, permanent, standing women's combat unit making up a substantial minority of the army" (22).

Goldstein's second exception is the participation of Soviet women in combat against Nazi Germany. He sorts through the Soviet-era propaganda and finds ample evidence of women participating in combat in almost every capacity: in an all-women dive-bomber regiment commanded by a woman; in a majority-women interceptor regiment led by a man; in mixed partisan and regular-army infantry units; and episodically in tank warfare. Without belaboring the point, Goldstein alludes to the contemporary relevance of these examples: "the mobilization of a substantial minority of women soldiers increased the state's military power" (70). In his chapter on female combat units, Goldstein performs a useful comparative exercise by contrasting the Soviet experience to Nazi Germany's experience in World War II. "The key factors that apparently opened the door for Soviet women in combat were desperation, total militarization of society, and an ideology that promoted women's participation outside of traditional feminine roles," Goldstein writes. "Nazi Germany was equally militarized, and eventually desperate, but had a radically different ideology that prohibited arming women" (72).

Biology Is Diversity, Culture Constrains

As in much of his study, Goldstein's Nazi-Soviet comparison highlights the social dimension of gender roles, with an emphasis on culture and ideology. This is not an incoming assumption for the author, for he explicitly tests the competing explanations, preferred by Fukuyama, that stress biology and especially genetics. Goldstein does, however, offer a preview of his position at the very outset of the book when he explains why he has eschewed the conventional terminological distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as a cultural one. In sharp contrast to Fukuyama's bred-in-the-bone contention, Goldstein offers almost the opposite of the common wisdom: "Biology provides diverse potentials, and cultures limit, select, and channel them." More strikingly Goldstein claims that "culture directly influences the expression of genes and hence the biology of our bodies." Thus, "no universal biological essence of 'sex' exists, but rather a complex system of potentials that are activated by various internal *and* external influences" (2, emphasis in original).

Goldstein's claim that culture influences genetic development and our very bodies might seem surprising at first, at least for social scientists poorly versed in biology. For many of us, his exposition of this claim, especially in chapter three, is eye-opening, although it is more familiar to those versed in the feminist scholarship upon which his book draws. If some of the evidence seems obvious in retrospect, other examples should be news to many readers from our field. In the obvious-in-retrospect category, Goldstein points out that cultures that favor boys over girls will typically encourage families to give priority to their male offspring in terms of nutrition and education, with measurable impact on physical and mental development. In the newsworthy category, Goldstein takes on the common notion that high testosterone levels cause high levels of aggression. To the extent that the evidence points to a correlation between testosterone and violence—in laboratory experiments with rats, for example—Goldstein indicates that the relationship holds for inter-male aggression "connected most with status hierarchies in breeding competition," but "the results do not seem to apply to other forms of aggression, including war" (148).

Goldstein reports an association between testosterone levels and inter-male (but evidently not inter-female) competition, although perhaps not what one would expect. Testosterone levels appear to reflect rather than cause changes in status. In experiments,

including some with humans, subjects with similar testosterone levels at the beginning of a competition over a status hierarchy emerged with noticeable differences at the end. The dominant subjects—the winners—had higher levels than the losers did. Thus, hierarchy, a sociocultural construction, produces biological changes, rather than the other way around. Goldstein locates the evolutionary origins of this phenomenon among species where high-status males who win conflicts typically do most of the breeding. He also ventures that the "lingering effects on our physiology could help explain" former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's claim that "power is the great aphrodisiac" (154–5).

The main point, elaborated in chapter 3, is that one searches in vain to explain male aggression, let alone war, on the basis of hormones or genes. Goldstein does acknowledge differences between males and females that might be considered "hard-wired," but the relationship to war is tenuous:

> Prenatal testosterone does have brain "wiring" effects that make men better than women on average at certain cognitive skills relevant to war—notably spatial ability and a propensity for rough-and-tumble play—and worse at other skills. However, the evidence that testosterone wires the male human brain for aggression is weak. If brain wiring were categorically different in males—different enough to account for war's being a virtually all-male occupation—the answers here should be much stronger and clearer. (179)

The question of how women and men differ on average lies at the heart of Goldstein's project. If men were 100 percent different from women on attributes associated with war—if males were uniformly the superior soldiers—the motivating puzzle of Goldstein's study would disappear. Instead, it is only on average that males are, for example, taller, stronger in their upper bodies, faster, and so forth. Goldstein develops this point through the heuristic device of the bell curve, showing in a series of illustrations that biological gender differences are not categorical. The bell curves overlap in varying degrees, with some women, for example, taller, stronger, or faster than some men. If soldiers were chosen solely on the basis of these physical traits, far more women would have fought in armies throughout history than the record shows.

If physical traits are not enough to produce such historically consistent gender differentiation in warfare, what about the behavioral characteristics that humans have inherited from closely related primates? Fukuyama makes much of the fact that "chimpanzees are man's closest evolutionary relative" and "of the 4,000 mammal and 10 million or more other species, only chimps and humans live in male-bonded, patrilineal communities in which groups of males routinely engage in aggressive, often murderous raiding of their own species."[8] Thus, he solves Goldstein's puzzle—the predominance of males in warfare. Goldstein, however, knows the literature in primatology better and points out that the chimps of Gombe—the source of Fukuyama's generalizations—are not the norm for the species in either their male coalition-building behavior or the exclusion of females from aggressive attacks on other groups.

Moreover, another primate species—the bonobo—is equally close to humans in evolutionary terms, but much closer to chimpanzees. Yet its behavior is considerably different in several dimensions from the male-dominant aggressiveness of chimps, "far more peaceful and gender-egalitarian." The fact that bonobo sexual behavior is "radically promiscuous, and bisexual in the case of females and some males" (186)—closer to that of humans than to that of chimpanzees—has led some observers to suggest that "Chimps are from Mars. Bonobos are from Venus" (189). Goldstein uses the evidence in a reprise of his leitmotiv: "The important conclusion that comes from the comparison of chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans is not that humans are naturally any particular way, but that what is 'natural' for humans apparently covers a broad array of possible social arrangements and behaviors, especially with regard to gender, sex, and violence. Once again, biology is diversity" (191). This is a far cry from Fukuyama's categorical conclusion based on his study of chimpanzees: "Humans are hard-wired to act in certain predictable ways."[9]

Cultural Construction of Children

In searching for innate differences between males and females, Goldstein came across *rough-and-tumble play,* a term used by developmental psychologists. It refers to behavior that is very physical and "basically includes fighting and chasing action patterns that are playfully motivated and delivered." It is not limited to humans, as anyone knows who has watched puppies or kittens at play, and experiments have demonstrated a biological basis for observed gender differences in the behavior. In fact, as Goldstein explains, "the rough-and-tumble play among young mammals exposed prenatally to testosterone is a far more robust effect than is any direct influence of testosterone on aggression itself" (177). Among humans, differences in play between boys and girls constitute one of the most distinctive cross-cultural commonalities.

Gender-differentiated play styles help explain Goldstein's puzzle of male-dominated warfare, but only in combination with key influences that fall under the rubric of socialization or cultural construction. The first is segregation of boys and girls, typically reinforced or engineered by parents and teachers. Goldstein points out that "children's gender segregation is much less pervasive and absolute than is gender segregation in war." Nevertheless, he sees it as "a first step in preparing children for war" (248–9). Rough-and-tumble play among boys becomes "tied directly to the boys' future roles in wartime (play-fighting, dominance, heroic themes, and specific war scripts)" (249).

The most powerful socializing processes are those that associate masculinity with toughness, discipline, and ability to control and hide emotions—traits valuable for engaging in warfare. Contra Fukuyama, Goldstein asserts that "war does not come naturally to men (from biology), so warriors require intense socialization and training in order to fight effectively. Gender identity becomes a tool with which societies induce men to fight" (252–3).[10] Women play a key role in this process by shaming boys and men who do not fit the masculine model and by embodying the "opposite" feminine model of the nurturing, emotional mother, lover, or nurse. This observation leads to troubling implications for women peace activists, who have sought to use their "female" attributes of empathy, cooperation, and nonviolent resolution of conflict to oppose masculine militarism.[11] For Goldstein, these women "have limited impact on the war system because their actions may feminize peace and thus reinforce

militarized masculinity" (413). The practice among male soldiers of feminizing their enemies "to encode domination" also reinforces the militarized masculine stereotype (406).[12]

Prospects for Change

Goldstein makes a convincing case that the main source of the male-dominated nature of the military system is cultural: "Cultural concepts of masculine and feminine are in many ways more rigid than biological gender. . . . Where biological gender gives us overlapping bell-curves," in terms of physical and psychological attributes, "cultural gender amputates these curves and gives us squared-off boxes containing all, and only, a certain category of person." It is through cultural construction that "modest biological tendencies" contributing "towards males' higher average war capability become transformed into all-male war" (252).

Fukuyama, believing that genetic sources of gender differentiation in war are more influential than cultural ones, is pessimistic about the prospects for change. He writes that "populations are not infinitely plastic in the way that their behavior can be shaped by society."[13] Nevertheless, he does observe a gradual feminization of politics among advanced industrial democracies—a process that he decries as posing dangers to those countries: "in a system of competitive states, the best regimes adopt the practices of the worst in order to survive."[14]

Is Goldstein more optimistic? Not really. His scholarly findings as well as his role as a parent make him concerned about the impact of culturally constructed gender identities, especially on males socialized to act, think, and feel like soldiers, but also on the females, who must deal with the consequences. "In raising boys into men, we can ask ourselves, day in and day out—as fathers, mothers, teachers, and other care-givers—whether we are producing warriors, and if so at what cost to the boy. We may be surprised to see how high the cost is, even if the boy never goes on to fight a war" (411). He suggests that whatever biological features distinguish boys from girls, such as "a propensity for rough-and-tumble play" and "keen attention to competitive status hierarchies," could be channeled into more productive endeavors—sports, for example—rather than preparation for violence. Interestingly, Fukuyama, from his evolutionary-biological premises, favors such productive alternatives too: "A professor receiving tenure at a leading university, a politician winning an election, or a CEO increasing market share may satisfy the same underlying drive for status as being the alpha male in a chimp community."[15] Those pursuits would still, in Fukuyama's view, be fulfilling some innate male drive and would not be undertaken, in any case, as a total substitution for soldiery.

Goldstein's cultural orientation allows him to imagine the possible emergence of "a space for alternative (less war-driven) gender identities to develop." Yet, remarkably, Goldstein joins Fukuyama in doubting whether such an outcome would be desirable. "Whole societies would still face an additional dilemma in raising boys: if they raise boys who are not warriors, they could someday be overrun by other societies that keep raising warriors." Ultimately, he concludes, "gender change may depend in part on change in the war system" (413, also 309–10). Goldstein's *War and Gender,* a refutation of most of the particulars of Fukuyama's argument, ends up with an identical policy implication. In the rough-and-tumble world of international politics, it could be dangerous to raise kinder, gentler boys—a practice akin to unilateral disarmament.

This is a conclusion that Goldstein, who describes his own political agenda as antiwar and feminist, reaches with evident reluctance. But could he not have reached a different one? Part of the problem lies in the way he defines the basic terms *war* and *the war system* right at the outset of the book. *War* he defines broadly as "lethal intergroup violence," which he acknowledges could encompass even the kinds of violent conflicts in which urban gangs engage. He defines *the war system* as "the interrelated ways that societies organize themselves to participate in potential and actual wars. . . . This system includes, for example, military spending and attitudes about war, in addition to standing military forces and actual fighting" (3). There is a certain tension between Goldstein's broad and loose definition of *war* and his more complicated description of a multifaceted *system* through which states organize for and undertake wars. (In this respect, Barbara Ehrenreich's critique of Fukuyama—"Wars are not barroom brawls writ large"[16]—is a precursor to Goldstein's work.) In defining *the war system,* Goldstein acknowledges the point implicit in Ehrenreich's critique, but he does not fully develop it. Governmental and societal institutions are heavily implicated in the processes that lead states to engage in warfare. Their role is hardly limited to the fostering of gender identities that associate masculinity with the attributes of warriors. Governments must raise taxes, build weapons, conscript soldiers, pursue policies that bring their states into conflict with others, and (for at least one side, anyhow) choose not to resolve those conflicts peacefully. It is a complex system, as Goldstein points out, and therein lies a possibility for hope of changing it: "in a feedback system with multiple causality, leverage at various points affects the whole system. . . . The war system is not set in stone, nor driven by any simple formula, but is alive, complex, and changeable. Complex systems hold many possibilities, as biology demonstrates" (413).

Resolving the Gender Security Dilemma

One possibility for coping with the problem of militarized gender identities would begin by taking seriously the concern expressed by Goldstein and Fukuyama about the gender security dilemma: the fear that states promoting more feminine gender roles for their citizens would be at risk from states and groups adhering to traditional masculine ones. Over the years international institutions—from the United Nations to specific arms-control regimes—have evolved to address the uncertainty and fears that lead states to engage in arms races. The militarized Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, could have been far more dangerous were it not for the institutions established to dampen and control the competition, regardless of their faults and inadequacies. International organizations are increasingly accorded roles in regulating matters that were formerly covered by the prerogative of national sovereignty, especially if those roles are understood to help preserve the peace. Examples include even the supervision of the writing of history textbooks to ensure that aggressive nationalist claims and

mythmaking do not foster sentiments among students that would induce them to support violence against neighboring countries. If the goal of demilitarizing masculine identities is hindered by fear that some countries will not go along (will "defect," in the language of game theory), why not attempt the institutional solutions that have been proposed to deal with similar problems in the international system? This might be the sort of thing Goldstein has in mind when he writes in his conclusion about the potential synergies between feminism and other theoretical approaches to international relations.

The suggestion of bringing international institutions to bear in regulating the construction of gender identities may seem incredible and utopian. But if we are persuaded of the centrality of gender to warfare—a point emphasized by Goldstein and Fukuyama both—and if we seek a more peaceful world, this may be the best solution. In fact the precedent for international involvement in issues related to gender already exists in the form of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The treaty, more than 20 years old, has been ratified by 171 countries, but not by the United States.[17]

Concerns about terrorism would appear to add urgency to efforts at dealing with the gendered sources of violence. In fact, a recent analysis of gender and terrorism echoes some of Fukuyama's concerns about demographic trends in certain countries that favor young men and suggests the need for international intervention in what would traditionally be considered domestic matters: "It is not accidental that the society with the highest sex ratio favoring men right now is Afghanistan. Without the beneficent effect of sufficient women, or without the representative voice in society which comes with power, education, or wealth, these lawless bands of low-status men invoke the strongest weapon of the weak to express their unfettered rage: terrorism." Thus, "the biggest threat" posed "to nations that breed terror lies in the education and empowerment of women."[18]

Such an analysis presumes that women would not share the grievances expressed by men in the form of terrorism and that educated, empowered women in countries such as Afghanistan would not support terrorists the way educated, empowered women in other societies have supported soldiers. Is there a relationship between the relative economic status of women and their propensity to support militarized masculinity? Are women from countries low in the international hierarchy more willing to raise soldiers to fight—under the banner of nationalism, for example—than are women from satisfied, status quo powers? Such questions receive little attention from Goldstein, but they might contribute to understanding how to escape the gender security dilemma that he finds at the core of the war system.

Research Directions: Past and Future

About 65 years ago, Virginia Woolf, in her still underappreciated masterpiece, *Three Guineas,* anticipated many of the hypotheses that Joshua Goldstein has evaluated in *War and Gender*. She even captured one of his key themes—the biological effects of culture, in the form of norms of gender discrimination. Writing in the dark days before the outbreak of World War II, Woolf sought to convey, in an extended response to a fund-raising letter from the treasurer of a peace organization, why her outlook on matters related to war and peace differed so much from his. She made the point that despite the fact that women were legally allowed to earn their own living in the professions (but only since 1919 in England), they still "differ[ed] enormously" from men. In fact, she distinguished between two "classes." In the realm of education, for example, "your class has been educated at public schools and universities for five or six hundred years, ours for sixty." Regarding property, "your class possesses in its own right and not through marriage practically all the capital, all the land, all the valuables, and all the patronage in England. Our class possesses in its own right and not through marriage practically none of the capital, none of the land, none of the valuables, and none of the patronage in England." Perhaps more metaphorically than Goldstein, she adduces the same point: "That such differences make for very considerable differences in mind and body, no psychologist or biologist would deny. . . . Though we see the same world, we see it through different eyes."[19]

Woolf would have had something to say about Fukuyama's proposals as well. Fukuyama suggests that status-seeking alpha males pursue the nonmilitary opportunities that a liberal market economy offers them in the universities, politics, and the stock market, as an alternative outlet for their aggressive proclivities. Woolf maintains that such competitive behavior under capitalism—even in seemingly benign institutions such as Cambridge and Oxford—is precisely what leads men to engage in wars. In her view, aggressive competition for university titles is a symptom of the same syndrome that induces soldiers to seek higher ranks through their military exploits.

As for women, she proposes two competing hypotheses for their attitude toward war. Denied education and property, treated as a slave to her father and husband, a woman might reject national sentiment and support for her country's wars by declaring that "as a woman I have no country." This slogan, mistakenly taken by some as an adequate summary of Woolf's argument, is in fact only one hypothesis. In an alternative hypothesis, Woolf posits that women support war in an attempt to achieve greater equality with men:

> How else can we explain that amazing outburst in August 1914, when the daughters of educated men . . . rushed into hospitals, some still attended by their maids, drove lorries, worked in fields and munitions factories, and used all their immense stores of charm, of sympathy, to persuade young men that to fight was heroic. . . . So profound was her unconscious loathing for the education of the private house with its cruelty, its poverty, its hypocrisy, its immorality, its inanity that she would undertake any task however menial, exercise any fascination however fatal that enabled her to escape. Thus consciously she desired "our splendid Empire"; unconsciously she desired our splendid war.[20]

Some evidence suggests that widespread participation by women in the Zapatista army of Chiapas—a phenomenon that Goldstein does not discuss—stems from dissatisfaction with their situations at home and from attempts to make a better life for themselves as independent women.[21]

Regardless of which hypothesis proved more plausible—and Woolf was better at proposing them than at testing them—she had a preferred solution: equality for women. She coined the term "equal pay for equal work" and was far ahead of her time (of our time, as well) in proposing that women receive wages from the state for their work as mothers. She put forward a claim that many feminists would endorse today, that "the |public and the private worlds are inseparably connected; that the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other." She ultimately decided that the cause of peace and the cause of women's equality "are the same and inseparable."[22] Other feminist scholars have drawn similar conclusions, from Cynthia Enloe's richly suggestive studies of gender, nationalism, and militarism, to the poet and political activist Margaret Randall's critiques of revolutionary movements in Cuba and Nicaragua (which she had supported, despite her growing disillusionment with the male leadership's failure to address women's concerns).[23]

In his otherwise near-encyclopedic coverage of hypotheses relating gender to war, Goldstein pays only a little attention to the relationship between gender inequality and war and hardly any to questions of nationalism or ethnic conflict. Given the ample variety of promising hypotheses put forward by feminists from Woolf to Enloe, this is an area of research that could use the systematic approach to evidence that Goldstein demonstrates so well in *War and Gender*. And if the "war on terrorism" is to be won, in part by advocating the liberation of Afghan and other women from patriarchal oppression, all the more reason for political scientists to devote serious attention to gender and war.

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Notes

1 Zakaria 1997 and 1999.
2 Fukuyama 1998, 27–8.
3 Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003.
4 Fukuyama 1998, 35–6.
5 Ibid., 39.
6 Ibid., 37.
7 Goldstein 2002.
8 Fukuyama 1998, 25.
9 Ibid., 30.
10 On the extraordinary efforts that armies and societies must undertake to get soldiers to overcome their aversion to killing, see Grossman 1995.
11 See, for example, Cockburn 1998. There is a longstanding debate on these issues within the feminist community of scholars and peace activists. See Lorentzen and Turpin 1998.
12 This practice was especially apparent in the wars in former Yugoslavia. See Borneman 1998; Allen 1996.

13 Fukuyama, 1998, 32.
14 Ibid., 36.
15 Ibid., 1998, 40.
16 Ehrenreich 1999, 118.
17 Kristof 2002. See also the UN Web page on the Convention, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.
18 McDermott 2002, 6. See also Pollitt 2001.
19 Woolf 1966, 18. Citations are to the paperback edition.
20 Ibid., 39.
21 Rojas 1994; Poniatowska 1995; Castro 1995.
22 Woolf 1966, 142–4.
23 Enloe 2000; Randall 1992.