OFFENSE OR DEFENSE: A TALE OF TWO COMMISSIONS

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Defence without the Bomb, Report of the
Alternative Defence Commission.
New York: Taylor & Francis, 1983, 311 pages.

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s,
Report of the European Security Study (ESECS).
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, 260 pages.

Across the political spectrum in the United States and Europe it has become commonplace to express support for de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in NATO military policy and for increasing reliance on conventional forces.[1] Beyond this initial point of agreement, however, the consensus breaks down. Two distinct "solutions" to NATO's overreliance on nuclear weapons emerge. One, represented by the Report of the Alternative Defence Commission, completely rejects nuclear weapons for European defense in favor of a non-provocative, purely defensive military posture—"defensive deterrence." The other, typified by the European Security Study (ESECS), maintains a significant role for nuclear weapons in NATO policy while shifting to a more offensively-oriented conventional strategy stressing deep strikes into Soviet and East European territory. NATO is currently in

[1] For a recent example from a perspective critical of current U.S. nuclear policies, see the Union of Concerned Scientists, *No First Use* (Cambridge, MA: 1983); for an example from a conservative viewpoint, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," *Commentary*, June 1983, pp. 15–35.

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the process of adopting such a Deep Strike strategy, with far-reaching implications for future European and American security.

In fact, it would be difficult to exaggerate the profoundly different consequences of these two "solutions" for the future of Europe. A truly nonnuclear defense policy, coupled with renunciation and removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, promises to lessen East-West military tensions, facilitate further disarmament measures, and encourage political reconciliation and cooperation in Europe. On the other hand, Deep Strike proposals, by emphasizing offensive strategies with advanced conventional weaponry and by retaining a large and varied arsenal of nuclear weapons, threaten to provoke a new arms race in Europe, exacerbate East-West political relations and increase the possibility of military conflict.

In promoting a Deep Strike solution to NATO's nuclear dilemma, alliance officials, and the authors of the European Security Study Report, seem as much concerned with how the public will perceive the new strategy as with its security implications. This is evident in ESECS's description of the two main goals of NATO: "deterrence—the effective discouragement of resort to war—and reassurance—the maintenance of self-confidence among the peoples and nations of the Alliance" (p. 8). Many of the ESECS members have had extensive experience in NATO nuclear weapons policy and are quite sensitive to the "requirements" of reassurance.[2] The group includes such erstwhile NATO civilian and military officials as Kennedy's National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, British Field Marshal Lord Carver, former NATO Supreme Commander General Andrew Goodpaster, and former Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Joergen Holst, as well as several members of the academic "defense community" involved in past NATO policymaking such as Robert Bowie and William Kaufmann.

The ESECS Report places most of the blame for the current "reassurance gap" on the Soviet Union. The report's authors believe that popular concern about nuclear war is mainly attributable to Soviet military programs —the achievement of strategic nuclear "parity" and, in the authors' view, Soviet superiority in conventional and "theater" nuclear forces. From past experience, however, the ESECS members are well aware that NATO policies have often alarmed more than reassured the public, even when these policies were promoted as responses to Soviet initiatives. The most notable recent example is the December 1979 decision to deploy U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, a move that heightened public anxiety over nuclear weapons and greatly strengthened the peace movement. The ESECS members do not want their proposal to provoke a similar response. Yet the Deep Strike strategy they advocate certainly has the potential to do

[2] The formulation comes from Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982–83), pp. 309–24.

so. When it was first discussed in military journals, Deep Strike was described as a dramatic break with NATO's more defensive policies of "flexible response" and "forward defense," in that it called for a bold, offensive strategy emphasizing deep attacks into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union immediately at the outset of a war.[3] The presentation of this proposal to a wider public demanded a different approach, one that stressed continuity, and even hinted that Deep Strike operations had always been an integral part of NATO strategy. The European Security Study Report serves this purpose. Sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, it is the first, and most prominent, public exposition of the emerging new NATO policy.

In this regard, the ESECS Report can be considered a NATO public relations document. The ESECS authors, like current NATO officials, stress the advantages of high-technology conventional weapons—particularly ballistic missiles armed with submunitions—in order to reassure the public that NATO is working to lessen the danger of nuclear war by "raising the nuclear threshold." They play down the new offensive nature of Deep Strike (they in fact do not name it as such) as well as the still-significant role of nuclear weapons in the strategy, for fear of alarming NATO public opinion. The Report seems intended to convince the public that NATO is moving away from reliance on nuclear deterrence, while production of nuclear weapons continues apace, and plans for nuclear "restructuring" envisage ever more demanding roles for them. The campaign seems to have achieved considerable success, judging from its reception in the popular press. In such respected papers as *The New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, the wonders of the new high-tech weapons have been praised, the new offensive nature of NATO strategy downplayed, and the role of nuclear weapons ignored.[4]

The role of nuclear weapons in the Alternative Defence Commission's report, on the other hand, is clear from its title, *Defence without the Bomb*. The Commission, based at the University of Bradford, England, was established "to examine a comprehensive set of alternative proposals which might be adopted if Britain abandoned its reliance on nuclear weapons." This basic premise—a principled rejection of nuclear weapons—is not merely stated, but is supported by careful argumentation, and its implications are addressed in an extremely thorough fashion. The Commission

[3] See, for example, "NATO's New Strategy: Defend Forward, but STRIKE DEEP," *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 120, No. 3 (November 1982), pp. 52 ff.

[4] For some examples, see the *New York Times* editorial, "High Tech's Promise to NATO," June 20, 1983; Deborah Shapley's laudatory article, "The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," *New York Times Magazine*, November 28, 1982; "NATO's New 'Conventional Option,' " *Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 1982; and "An Ironic Way to Check the Nuclear Arms Race," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 6, 1983.

considers several choices for Britain: remaining in a NATO alliance that is moving toward a non-nuclear posture; opting for a policy of non-alignment; or attempting to form some kind of European defense organization without the United States. It also discusses British and European defense options, including a "more-of-the-same" conventional buildup, a high-tech Deep Strike solution of the sort proposed by ESECS, a defense-in-depth strategy, guerrilla warfare, and defense by non-violent civil resistance. The Report tries to cover the political aspects of these issues as well as their implications for disarmament and East-West relations.

At first glance, *Defence without the Bomb* seems as much a response to growing public concern about nuclear weapons as the ESECS Report initially does. In one sense it is, because the project would probably not have been undertaken without substantial public support for nuclear disarmament and widespread interest in alternative non-nuclear defense policies. On the other hand, many of the Commission's proposals, like those of the European Security Study, have been around for many years (albeit in less developed form), and would have been advocated regardless of the level of concern about nuclear war among the public. Fortunately, growing awareness of the dangers of the arms race has made such a comprehensive study possible and may improve the chances that its proposals will be implemented.

The Alternative Defence Commission includes experienced researchers in the field of military policy and disarmament, such as Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, Michael Randle, the project coordinator, and Frank Blackaby, the Chair, as well as representatives of British trade unions, political parties, and religious organizations. In this sense, it is inappropriate to call the Report a "response" to public concern about nuclear weapons. Many of the members of the Commission were themselves instrumental in making people in Europe aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons and in gathering support for the initiatives of the movement for European Nuclear Disarmament. The Commission received comments and advice from numerous European and American specialists, military officers, and other interested individuals, including some—such as David Holloway, Michael Howard, and Simon Lunn—who also participated in the work of the European Security Study.

Together, the Alternative Defence Commission and the European Security Study raise many issues related to European defense, ranging from the nature of the Soviet threat to the potential uses of high-technology weaponry.[5] This essay will focus on those questions that seem most crucial to an evaluation of alternative defense policies: whether the proposed poli-

[5] Please note the respective formats of the two studies. The European Security Study consists, in addition to the Report of the Steering Group, of three main sections, each based on a workshop in which outside experts as well as steering committee members participated. For each topic—The Soviet Threat

cies would be more or less able to prevent war than NATO's current posture, and whether in the event of war the proposed strategies would make the use of nuclear weapons more or less likely.

Offensive Strategies and Crisis Stability

As the title of their report indicates, the authors of the European Security Study believe their proposals will lead to the strengthening of deterrence in Europe. They also claim that, although NATO will still rely on the use of nuclear weapons at all levels, the ESECS proposals will serve to "raise the nuclear threshold," so that resort to nuclear weapons will not occur early in the course of a war. But, as will be seen, these two goals—preventing the outbreak of war in Europe, and reducing the chances of a war becoming nuclear—are not well served by the ESECS proposals.

To begin with, it is almost certain that the Soviet Union will interpret a new NATO Deep Strike strategy as offensively oriented. This perception, combined with the reality of the new weapons and doctrines emphasizing offensive operations, will contribute to instability during crises and in the end make war more likely. One need not be a military expert to recognize the potentially provocative nature of the Deep Strike strategy. The strategy emphasizes attacks against second- and third-echelon or "follow-on" forces, lines of communication, choke-points, and airbases located deep in Eastern European and Soviet territory. In order to be most effective, such attacks must be carried out during the first stages of hostilities. Successful defense of Western Europe, then, becomes dependent on early initiation of NATO offensive operations.

It is widely acknowledged that when the offense dominates, countries feel much more insecure during times of crisis for fear that the other side will gain an advantage by striking first. This fear creates pressures for preemption and thus increases the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The authors of the ESECS Report seem barely to grasp the implications of this dilemma, although it has long been recognized and has received particularly careful attention in recent years.[6]

The closest they come to considering the issue is an almost perfunctory

in the 1980s, Requirements of Conventional Defense, and Contributions of Advanced Technology—a workshop report is provided, along with one or two "supporting papers."

The Report of the Alternative Defence Commission consists of an introduction, a summary of conclusions and recommendations, eight well-documented chapters discussing in detail the basis for the Commission's findings and proposals, and six appendices. The topics considered in the eight chapters are broad-ranging, due to the nature of the questions the Commission posed and the thoroughness with which the members set out to answer them.

[6] An important discussion is found in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214; for more detailed treatments see Jack Lewis Snyder, *Defending the Offensive: Biases on French, German, and Russian War Planning*, 1870–1914 (Ph.D. dis-

mention of "crisis stability." Here the authors reveal that they do not really understand the concept, by confusing it with deterrence of aggressive threats. Defining crisis stability as the "capacity to check any impulse to force in a time of crisis," they go on to argue:

> To achieve and maintain stability in a crisis generated by an apparent threat or risk of aggression, NATO must counter the threat in a manner that neither undermines the firmness of its own governments and peoples nor provokes a resort to force by others. We find it a particular value of improved conventional capability that it can contribute to crisis stability. (p. 9)

But, there is nothing in the nature of "improved conventional capability" that contributes to crisis stability. If the weapons, and the missions they are intended to fulfill, are perceived as more effective for offensive purposes than defensive ones, if they perform better when used preemptively or immediately at the outset of hostilities, they will contribute to *instability* and invite preemption in times of acute crisis. This is an important, indeed fundamental principle in the study of military strategy, but one completely neglected by the ESECS authors.

A case in point is the ESECS proposal for the attrition of Warsaw Pact airpower early on in the conflict. For this task, the authors argue that "Direct attacks on Main Operating Bases (MOBs)" to "disrupt operations and destroy exposed aircraft" constitute "the single most effective means of defeating Warsaw Pact airpower." Although the authors recommend that "such attacks should be initiated while the first waves of Warsaw Pact aircraft are still in the air," it is clear these attacks would be far more effective if initiated *before* the Warsaw Pact planes actually take off, i.e., if they were *preemptive* strikes. The Soviets undoubtedly understand the value of preemption when both sides' forces are better oriented to offensive than defensive tasks. During a period of crisis, when both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were bringing their forces up to greater degrees of readiness, the pressure on both sides to preempt would be considerable, and the implications for crisis stability potentially disastrous.

Nonetheless, the ESECS members seem to believe that their protestations of defensive intent will suffice to reassure the Soviets. After describing their proposals for Deep Strike weapons in some detail, the authors write:

> It is important to point out, however, that any NATO posture would be defensive and reactive. The missile-with-submunitions concept proposed above

sertation, Columbia University, 1981); and Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983). Anders Boserup discusses the issue with particular reference to European security in "Nuclear Disarmament: Non-Nuclear Defence," in Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, eds., *Disarming Europe* (London: Merlin Press, 1982), pp. 185–192.

would be implemented only as a response to a Soviet attack which had already begun; in this sense, the concept has the advantage of blocking Soviet offensive options without itself posing an offensive threat. Furthermore, however offensive certain aspects of NATO tactics may appear, the overall NATO posture remains defensive. (p. 205)

Such verbal assurances may serve to assuage Western concerns about NATO policies, but it is naive to think that they will persuade the Soviets of NATO's purely defensive intent. It is not uncommon for a country that emphasizes offensive *operations* in its military policy to have this misinterpreted as representing aggressive *intentions*. The best example involves the Soviet Union itself. The current Soviet military strategy, stressing offensive conventional operations, reflects the Soviet Union's determination not to fight another war deep in its own territory. This strategy, however, has been perceived in the West as evidence of Soviet aggressive designs toward Western Europe. A similar purpose has been imputed to recent developments in Soviet tactical air forces, purportedly indicating a shift from the defensive to the offensive.[7]

It is unlikely that the Soviets will interpret NATO's change in strategy with any greater equanimity, especially when many Western strategists are calling for an offensive reorientation in NATO policy well beyond the level of strategy and tactics. Harvard professor and government advisor Samuel Huntington, for example, has recently advocated a return to the U.S. Cold War policy of "roll-back," aimed at militarily forcing the Soviets out of Eastern Europe.[8] Similar goals seem to underlie current doctrinal writings of the U.S. Army.[9]

Is it so unreasonable, then, to believe that the Soviets could misinterpret NATO intentions and respond to a Deep Strike strategy in ways that could have dangerous consequences? Might not the Soviet Union, for example, have a real fear of preemptive attack and thus initiate conflict itself? The ESECS members themselves offer an answer. "Large scale insurrection in Eastern Europe," they note, "might cause the Soviet Union to use military force against NATO if it felt NATO was about to intervene. In the Soviet view their action would be one of preempting an attack by the West" (p. 43). Christopher Donnelly offers further insights into this problem in discussing Soviet vulnerabilities in his ESECS supporting paper: "By its own admission, the Soviet Army is riddled with problems and an abundance of

[7] Matthew A. Evangelista, "The Evolution of Soviet Tactical Air Forces," in David R. Jones, ed., *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, Vol. 7 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, forthcoming).
[8] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy," in Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983).
[9] See, e.g., Donn R. Starry, "Extending the Battlefield," *Military Review*, Vol. 61, No. 3 (March 1981), pp. 34–36.

vulnerabilities. Perhaps the most significant is their own vulnerability to 'being surprised.' It is not *simply* 'window dressing' to begin each major exercise in the Warsaw Pact with a NATO attack."

Despite, or perhaps because of, Donnelly's observation, the European Security Study has chosen a strategy that exploits this serious Soviet vulnerability. The ESECS members seem not to recognize that in doing so they increase the probability of the very scenario they believe would most likely lead to war in Europe—namely, a Soviet preventive attack against the West launched during the course of putting down an East European revolt, for fear of Western interference. Deep Strike weapons must appear to the Soviets as ideally suited for disrupting a Soviet operation against another Warsaw Pact member. For example, if these weapons perform as their promoters promise,[10] they will have the capability for selectively destroying communications and logistics centers, bridges, and rail connections, with little "collateral damage." The consequent dangers are twofold: either that the Soviets will interpret NATO's "limited" intervention as a cover for a major attack and seek to preempt it, or that NATO will view the Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe as an attempt to expand westward and launch a preemptive, Deep Strike "counteroffensive." The first danger is particularly serious because of the historical experience of World War II. After the disaster of June 1941, the Soviets vowed never again to be caught off guard. If they fulfill this promise during a period of intense crisis by preempting a Deep Strike attack that NATO may have planned only as a "defensive" response, the consequent disaster would probably be without precedent—especially given the high risk that it would become nuclear.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in "Conventional Deterrence"

Unfortunately, the ESECS proposal contributes not only to the possibility of conventional war by miscalculation, but also to the likelihood that such a war would quickly turn nuclear. One reason is the continued reliance it places on nuclear weapons. The ESECS authors argue that "NATO defense will continue for the foreseeable future to rest on the close and indivisible linkage of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces" (p. 141). In this connection, they favor deployment of the new Pershing II and cruise missiles as well as "modernization" of other NATO nuclear weapons.

These weapons figure prominently, for example, in Donald Cotter's proposal, set forth in his ESECS supporting paper, for "nuclear force re-

[10] For skeptical evaluations of the technical capabilities of the Deep Strike weapons, see Fred Kaplan, "Plans for New Weaponry Touch Off a Fight in the Pentagon," *Boston Globe*, June 18, 1983, pp. 1, 8; and Michael R. Gordon, " 'E.T.' Weapons to Beef up NATO Forces Raise Technical and Political Doubts," *National Journal*, February 19, 1983, pp. 364–369.

structuring" leading to an "integrated conventional/nuclear modernization force" (pp. 245–247). Cotter stresses that "*The realistic threat of the use of nuclear weapons will enhance NATO's ability to defend with conventional forces*" (p. 234, original emphasis). He goes on to argue that "Future nuclear forces should include longer-range strike systems in sufficient quantity to be able to threaten and hold at risk Soviet/Pact forces throughout the depth of their deployment." According to Cotter, the "main objective" should be to threaten Soviet follow-on forces "deep in Pact territory and the Western Military Districts" of the Soviet Union.

This proposal is identical to the "integrated battlefield" concept formulated by General Donn Starry when he headed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command: "[O]n an integrated battlefield, systems designed to defeat enemy assault elements, to disrupt follow-on forces and to seize the initiative by attack must be able to deliver conventional and/or nuclear fires throughout the spectrum of the battle—throughout the depth of a battlefield."[11] Starry's requirements for implementing the proposal are the same as those of the European Security Study: sophisticated target-acquisition systems, dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) delivery vehicles "to hold enemy follow-on echelons at risk in peacetime and to attack them successfully in wartime," and improved command and control capabilities. The ESECS group adds one more requirement for a nuclear war-fighting capability in Europe that Starry does not emphasize—the ability of NATO communications and target-acquisition systems to survive electromagnetic and other effects of nuclear explosions in order to prosecute an extended nuclear war.

One gets the impression from reading the ESECS proposal in tandem with those such as Extending the Battlefield, that the ESECS group, consciously or not, has advocated precisely those improvements necessary for a nuclear war-fighting capability in Europe. But, by largely avoiding mention of nuclear weapons, the ESECS Report misleads its readers into thinking that it is merely a proposal for "raising the nuclear threshold" by strengthening conventional forces. In fact, the ESECS proposals are apt to make nuclear war more likely.

First of all, they depend heavily on ballistic missiles for "deep interdiction" of Warsaw Pact airbases and follow-on forces. The authors acknowledge that these weapons "are associated in the public mind with the nuclear task," and they therefore recommend that new systems, derived for example from the Patriot air defense missile, "though costing more, would appear to offer political advantages" (p. 206). Again, the focus is on "reassurance." The authors neglect to mention, however, that many of the pro-

[11] Starry (fn. 9), pp. 35–36.

grams already in development, including those promoted in the ESECS Report, do incorporate aspects of current nuclear weapons systems—such as the booster stage of the Pershing II and Trident missiles and an advanced version of the current Lance missile.

While sensitive to public perceptions in NATO, the authors have neglected the possible Soviet responses to deployment of thousands of new ballistic missiles in Western Europe. In so doing, the authors have ignored a major concern of NATO Supreme Commander Bernard Rogers by not giving any attention "to the problems incurred from employing conventional munitions with vehicles associated in the enemy's mind exclusively with nuclear weapons, i.e., cruise missiles and ballistic missiles such as Pershing and Trident."[12] In the event of war, will the Soviets be able to distinguish non-nuclear from nuclear-armed missiles?

This problem will be exacerbated if the currently planned modernizations proceed. The new advanced Lance missile, for example, will be capable of delivering "nuclear, chemical and highly advanced conventional warheads on selected targets."[13] The ESECS authors believe that such dual- and multi-capable systems "greatly complicate the enemy's task by increasing his uncertainty" as to the type of warheads deployed (p. 206). Soviet uncertainty does not perforce constitute a NATO advantage, however, especially when the likely consequences include escalation to nuclear war. Furthermore, if the Soviets are familiar with U.S. Army doctrinal writings, they will surely understand the implications of the fact that many commanders consider conventional weapons an inferior substitute for nuclear weapons. General Starry makes this point clearly when describing his "integrated battle" strategy: "Options at this stage include deep nuclear strikes with Lance or air-delivered weapons . . . Of course, the commander must have a strong conventional option in the event nuclear release is not forthcoming."[14] It is quite possible that the Soviets will view the use of conventional Lance missiles as a prelude to the use of nuclear ones, as U.S. commanders await release orders. Worse yet, they will not know when these orders are received and could well interpret the launch of conventionally-armed missiles as the start of a nuclear war. In either case, the potential for nuclear escalation should be evident.

[12] The ESECS members also did not heed Rogers' warning regarding cost estimates for the Deep Strike proposals. Those cited in Cotter's supporting paper are the same ones about which Rogers wrote, "I must caution you that some of the comparative costs you referred to strike me as perhaps being overly optimistic contractor estimates rather than realistic program costs." See Rogers' letter to the *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 120, No. 5 (Janaury 1983), p. 5.

[13] Deputy Under Secretary of Defense James P. Wade, quoted in the *Washington Post*, November 20, 1981, p. A24.

[14] Starry (fn. 9), p. 40.

Another potential route to nuclear escalation lies in the ESECS proposals to target and destroy Warsaw Pact command, control, and communications facilities early in a war. If any of these facilities are associated with command of Soviet nuclear weapons, which is likely, attacking them will make the Soviets fear a loss of control over their retaliatory systems, and may induce them to launch their weapons first, precipitating nuclear war. Similar problems will arise if any of the new Deep Strike weapons appear to threaten Soviet strategic nuclear systems during the course of a conventional war.[15]

One professed goal of the European Security Study is to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO policy. Yet the authors state that "Nuclear weapons will remain an essential component of NATO strategy in order to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons, hold Soviet forces at risk, thereby ensuring their dispersal, and threaten retaliation against Soviet first use" (p. 199). The authors seem to perceive a difference between their first objective—deterring Soviet use of nuclear weapons—and their third—threatening retaliation against Soviet first use. They apparently believe that the threat of NATO nuclear retaliation is in itself not a sufficient deterrent to Soviet use of nuclear weapons. Thus, they argue that "Both deterrence and reassurance depend on having a fighting capability that is seen to be effective" (p. 11). They seem to agree with General Starry that "Theater forces should not be considered solely as a bridge to strategic nuclear war. They are weapons which must be considered in the context of a war-fighting capability."[16]

Among the war-fighting tasks, the authors believe that a nuclear "capability to attack large, dense Warsaw Pact ground force concentrations threatening NATO's forward defenses remains indispensable" (p. 199). An additional task, "holding Soviet forces at risk," frequently mentioned throughout the ESECS Report, is never explicitly defined, although it seems to entail rather more than the capability to attack Soviet ground forces. In an article published in *Strategic Review*, and cited in his supporting paper, Donald Cotter states that " 'Hold at risk' means to 1) continuously target enemy forces with operationally ready U.S./Allied nuclear forces; and 2) maintain the ability to execute limited or major strikes quickly across the full range of echeloned forces, as well as on threatening military forces in the Soviet Union." He draws an analogy to "current U.S. strategic-offensive force capabilities and planning," but claims that theater nuclear forces must also be capable of "realistically" threatening Soviet

[15] For a compelling discussion of this problem in the context of Northern European security, see Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 28–54.

[16] Starry (fn. 9) p. 34.

conventional forces "throughout the depth of their deployment." Cotter supports the current NATO plan to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe but argues that "the 'hold-at-risk' rationale described above calls for greater numbers" of nuclear weapons, with higher firing rates. He suggests an extended-range, multiple-warhead version of the Pershing II missile as one possible solution.[17]

Any U.S./NATO nuclear force that can fulfill a "hold-at-risk" requirement—in other words, that can continuously target the full range of Soviet forces and quickly execute major strikes against them—is essentially a first-strike force, and the Soviets will certainly perceive it as such. Cotter's analogy to U.S. strategic forces is revealing in this regard. During the 1960s, when the late RAND Corporation strategist Herman Kahn advocated a strategic posture nearly identical to Cotter's, he called it Type II Deterrence or the "Credible-First-Strike Capability."[18] In essence, then, what the European Security Study proposes as NATO's nuclear weapons policy is the capability to execute a disarming first strike against Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, including those located deep in Soviet territory.

Such are the ESECS nuclear weapons proposals, which—according to the Report's preface—"reflect genuine consensus among a group with diverse backgrounds" (p. *x*). The ESECS members unequivocably reject a NATO "no-first-use" pledge, and instead advocate NATO first use of nuclear weapons for a variety of demanding tasks. The European Security Study proposals for "strengthening conventional deterrence" presume a major modernization of nuclear forces as well, all at the expense of deterrence and stability. It is disturbing to see people who support the idea of no-first-use in one form or another, including McGeorge Bundy and Lord Carver, serving on the ESECS Steering Group and endorsing these proposals in "genuine consensus."[19] The ESECS proposals will not even accomplish the group's primary goal which is to reduce the likelihood of early escalation to nuclear weapons during a conventional war.

The combination of long-range conventional weapons that are best used preemptively and a nuclear force that threatens the Soviets with a disarming first strike will not "raise the nuclear threshold." As the military his-

[17] Donald R. Cotter, "NATO Theater Nuclear Forces: An Enveloping Military Concept," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 48–50.

[18] See Fred Kaplan's discussion in *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 223–224.

[19] McGeorge Bundy came out in favor of "no-first-use" in his article with George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 753–68; Lord Carver is listed in the Union of Concerned Scientists' booklet, *No First Use*, as having "expressed general agreement with the report and its conclusions," p. *v.*, which in fact seem to support many of the weapons and strategies included in the Deep Strike proposals.

torian Colonel Trevor Dupuy points out in a critique of the Deep Strike strategy, these developments may raise the threshold for NATO—by making early resort to nuclear weapons by NATO unnecessary—but "they lower it for the Soviets" by putting pressure on them to use their nuclear weapons before they are lost to a NATO strike.[20] Since it takes only one side to initiate a nuclear war, the ESECS proposal makes that prospect more likely by inducing a Soviet sense of vulnerability to preemptive conventional and nuclear attack.

The ESECS combination of Deep Strike and first-use policies represents an additional danger, one that the Steering Group members seem not to have recognized—the danger that they would be used not only in Europe but in the course of U.S. military intervention in the Third World. There is good reason for concern about this possibility. New Army concepts such as Deep Strike and Extending the Battlefield are intended for use throughout the world. As General Starry writes, "It is important that this capability be developed at corps and divisions for nuclear as well as for conventional and chemical targeting. It is important that it be done in all U.S. Army units worldwide."[21] Starry is currently in charge of the Central Command, the new name for the Rapid Deployment Force, established during the Carter administration for intervention in the Persian Gulf. The new military plans are designed to add credence to the "Carter Doctrine," which explicitly threatened U.S. first use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.[22]

There is a good chance that the ESECS proposals will lead to a conventional buildup that will facilitate the use of U.S. forces for foreign intervention. There is a clear historical precedent in the switch to a "flexible response" doctrine in the 1960s. Justified by some as a requirement for European defense, it was put into practice in the jungles of Vietnam, fortunately short of its provision for first use of nuclear weapons. There is no guarantee that this aspect of the precedent will apply the next time.[23]

What is perhaps most disturbing about the ESECS Report is that its authors never consider whether such a dangerous and provocative strategy as Deep Strike is the best way to thwart a Soviet conventional invasion of Europe, or even whether a major buildup is at all necessary. They offer no evidence to support their contention that "The Warsaw Pact currently has superiority in its conventional forces against NATO" (p. 12) and their analysis of the requirements for European defense suffers accordingly. The

[20] Trevor N. Dupuy, "Why Strike Deep *Won't* Work," *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 120, No. 5 (January 1983), p. 56.

[21] Starry (fn. 9), p. 47.

[22] See the articles in the January 1983 issue of *MERIP Reports*, esp. Christopher Paine's excellent piece, "On the Beach: The Rapid Deployment Force and the Nuclear Arms Race," pp. 3–11.

[23] See Kaplan's discussion in *The Wizards of Armageddon*, Ch. 23.

ESECS Report follows a long tradition of exaggerating Soviet conventional capabilities in order to promote new weapons "required" to counter them. In the past, this led to an unnecessary reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.[24] Now the same misrepresentation of Soviet capabilities is being used to justify the deployment of high-tech conventional weapons.

The ESECS authors generally tend to emphasize Soviet strengths and ignore Soviet weaknesses. For example, they seem to disregard the potential unreliability of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies and write only of "the large and steadily increasing Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe" (p. 33). There is not a single mention of the debilitating effect on Warsaw Pact military strength caused by the current crisis in Poland, formerly considered one of the Pact's strongest members militarily. Nor do the ESECS authors acknowledge that the obvious occupation function of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is bound to affect their military potential. In his supporting paper, for example, Hannes Adomeit writes of the "most dramatic change" for the better in "Warsaw Pact force capabilities and readiness for combat in Europe," following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He underplays the significance of the disintegration of the Czechoslovak armed forces and ignores the self-evident occupation role of Soviet forces deployed in their place. As far as "capabilities and readiness for combat in Europe" is concerned, it is clear that the Soviet Army poses a much greater threat to *Eastern* Europe than it does to the West.[25]

When the ESECS Report mentions Soviet vulnerabilities and weaknesses at all, it does so only to make its proposal for striking Warsaw Pact second- and third-echelon forces seem more promising. This has led one military critic to complain that "The most important shortcoming of the concept is the basic assumption that our potential foes are a bit stupid, and that they will adhere rigidly to the doctrines which give some people hope that [Deep Strike] might have some chance of success."[26]

Some of the best arguments against the ESECS proposals are found in the Report's own "supporting papers." For example, if the ESECS Steering Group had paid more attention to Christopher Donnelly's supporting paper (in this case clearly a misnomer), they would have been far less enthusiastic about Deep Strike proposals to target Soviet second- and third-echelon forces. In his historical treatment of the Soviet concept of

[24] See Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982–83), pp. 110–138; and Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine* (New York: Random House, 1983).

[25] Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981); and Matthew A. Evangelista, "Leading the Pact," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 12, No. 9 (October 1982), pp. 7–9.

[26] Dupuy (fn. 20).

echeloning and the development of the "Operational Maneuver Group" (OMG), Donnelly emphasizes the importance that the Soviets attach to achieving early successes—not the least in order to prevent their East European allies from deserting, as well as to disrupt NATO mobilization of reserves. He claims that the Soviets would count on breaking through NATO's defenses and inserting OMGs behind NATO lines on the first or second day of an invasion. Thus, "if the offensive is in one operational echelon, NATO's plans for interdiction (with nuclear and conventional forces) against a *second* operational echelon will be in vain. There may well be no such echelon within East Germany for several days" (pp. 128–129).

Donnelly claims that surprise would be essential for a successful Soviet invasion. He points out that the Soviets must surprise not only NATO but their own army and the armies of their Warsaw Pact allies: "If every Soviet soldier knows war is about to start, it will be no surprise to NATO. Given ample warning of possible war, Moscow's Eastern European allies might well discover ways of keeping out of the fighting, and their armies might have time to think twice about the cause for which they are dying" (p. 117). One infers from Donnelly's analysis that NATO should pay greater attention to problems associated with surprise attack and should concentrate its efforts on defending against the Soviet first-echelon forces.

Neither issue receives adequate attention in the ESECS Report. Focusing only on the technical aspects of preventing surprise attack, the ESECS Report treats this problem as if it were no different from the task of acquiring targets to destroy in the course of a war. Thus the authors propose that general reconnaissance and surveillance be treated in the same way as target acquisition: "[I]f the overall reconnaissance effort can be redirected to focus on target acquisition rather than surveillance, a more efficient utilization of resources can be expected, and the development of future systems can be influenced to correspond more closely to NATO requirements for enhanced target acquisition" (p. 148). It is difficult to avoid the impression that the authors are far more interested in obtaining "war-fighting" systems than those that might help prevent war.

Regarding the need to counter Soviet first-echelon forces and prevent a quick breakthrough, the authors again evince relatively little interest. They devote virtually no attention to comparatively inexpensive but effective means of blunting the first wave of a Soviet invasion, such as tank traps and barriers,[27] in favor of dangerous, expensive, and unnecessary Deep Strike

[27] For one proposal, see J.F.C. Tillson IV, "The Forward Defense of Europe," *Military Review*, Vol. 61, No. 5 (May 1981), pp. 66–76; the use of barriers may be considered objectionable on political grounds, because it symbolizes a permanent Cold War division of Europe, but this would hardly be a reason for the ESECS group to neglect it.

capabilities. Indeed, if the authors had given this issue any serious attention, they would have found that many experts believe NATO already has the ability to halt an initial Soviet invasion and prevent an easy victory. Two years ago, for example, the editors of *International Defense* wrote that "Following the conclusion of NATO's autumn [1981] maneuvers, force commanders are confident that they would be able to defeat an initial armored attack launched by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe." The journal went on to quote General Mainhard Glanz, Chief of Staff of the West German Army:

> [T]he first wave of attackers probably would not even be able to hold their positions, Glanz opined. The wide plains of northern West Germany, he noted, are not "motorways for panzers," and the hundreds of villages, small towns and cities between Frankfurt and Hamburg could become pockets of resistance which could force the massive columns of the Warsaw Pact into smaller units, breaking their order of battle and stopping the offensive.[28]

John Mearsheimer came essentially to the same conclusions in a detailed study that evidently was not consulted by members of the ESECS group.[29] By ignoring such evidence the European Security Study authors leave their readers with the conventional wisdom of Soviet conventional superiority, but no serious analysis of the true state of affairs.

Defensive Deterrence

If the Soviets could not achieve a quick victory in Europe, they would face growing unrest in the ranks of the Warsaw Pact armies, continued reinforcements of NATO forces, and the ever-present prospect of escalation to nuclear war. It seems then that current NATO conventional strength constitutes a strong deterrent to any Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The problem remains though that if deterrence fails, if war for some reason breaks out, the risk of nuclear catastrophe is enormous. This is one reason for the Alternative Defence Commission's total rejection of nuclear weapons and its support for a policy of "defensive deterrence." Such a policy is intended to ensure, to the extent possible, that nuclear weapons will never be used in Europe, and that European military forces will be employed solely for defense.

A NATO declaration of "no-first-use" represents only one step toward this goal. Others include withdrawing current battlefield nuclear weapons,

[28] *International Defense*, DMS Intelligence, November 9, 1981.

[29] John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3–39; see also his "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 104–122.

removing as a matter of priority Pershing II and cruise missiles if they are installed, and establishing nuclear-free zones. The Commission also advocates an explicit "decoupling" of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons from European defense—a rejection of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" (pp. 90–94). These measures, the Commission believes, will greatly reduce the danger that NATO or the United States might initiate nuclear war.

As to Soviet use of nuclear weapons, the Commission recognizes that neither the Soviet pledge of no-first-use nor implementation of nuclear-free zones constitutes a reliable guarantee against the Soviets' employing nuclear weapons in the event of war. The Commission therefore recommends as additional protection unilateral initiatives that could eliminate incentives for a Soviet nuclear attack. These initiatives include the removal of any bases or facilities that could support a U.S. nuclear attack against the Soviet Union; the dispersal of forces and decentralization of command and control structures, so as not to present tempting targets for nuclear weapons; and the avoidance of provocative postures, such as Deep Strike and the current first-use doctrine, that threaten Soviet nuclear forces and could induce a preemptive strike in time of crisis. Finally, the Commission recommends that NATO should not deploy dual-capable systems, such as cruise missiles, which have been associated in any way with nuclear missions.

It should be clear that these measures are in most respects the opposite of those proposed by the European Security Study. The difference is that the ESECS group has concentrated on reassuring Western public opinion that NATO's nuclear weapons policies are not dangerous and will be even less so if the ESECS proposals are adopted. The Alternative Defence Commission, on the other hand, has focused on how actually to make NATO nuclear weapons policies less dangerous, first by eliminating nuclear weapons from NATO defense and then by reassuring the *Soviet Union* that NATO no longer poses a nuclear threat of the kind that could force Soviet preemption.

Thus the Commission emphasizes political as well as military measures. For example, in order to increase the inhibition against the use of nuclear weapons, "NATO, or any alternative European alliance, could issue a public reminder at the outbreak of war, or at a moment of acute crisis when war seemed imminent, that it had no nuclear weapons and would not sanction any use of them on its behalf." Furthermore, "Europe could try to avoid Soviet preemptive nuclear action by assuaging genuine fears; advance inspection measures, for instance, could go some way to convincing the Soviet Union that tactical nuclear weapons had indeed been removed" (p. 43).

The Commission's balance of military and political means of dealing with the Soviet Union offers a marked contrast to the European Security Study's preference for strictly military solutions. Each approach derives

from a particular interpretation of the nature of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the ESECS Report's view of Soviet policy as ideologically-based and expansionistic, the Alternative Defence Commission sees the U.S.S.R. mainly as a highly security-conscious, internally conservative country seeking to maintain its great-power status. This perspective underlies the Commission's proposal for combining a strong, defensively-oriented, non-nuclear military posture with political reassurances designed to alleviate Soviet security concerns. In this respect, it bears considerable resemblance to the policies carried out by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland,[30] and indeed the Swedish case has received a good deal of attention from Commission members.

In general, the Commission approaches the problems of defending Europe in a much broader fashion than do the members of the European Security Study. They do not infer a single, rigid invasion scenario from Soviet doctrine and exercises, but rather consider a range of plausible circumstances under which war could break out in Europe. The Commission believes that a Soviet "out-of-the-blue" nuclear attack or an all-out blitzkrieg across Western Europe are the two least likely scenarios for a future war. More likely are situations involving limited Soviet attack in Europe. The Commission finds the prospects of war resulting from a conflict in Eastern Europe—such as a Soviet invasion of Poland—to be the most plausible. The European Security Study also evaluated these potential war scenarios and came to nearly identical conclusions, although these were not reflected in the group's proposals.

The Alternative Defence Commission considers an ESECS-style proposal among one of seven "broad military options within the framework of NATO." These are: retaining NATO's current conventional forces and forward defense strategy; shifting to an offensive Deep Strike strategy; implementing a major conventional buildup; reinforcing existing forces with territorial defense units; switching to a purely defensive orientation relying on anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons; abandoning forward defense in favor of an in-depth defensive posture; and moving from an integrated command structure to a looser coalition of national forces employing in-depth strategies.

The Commission rejects the Deep Strike proposal on the grounds that it is the one strategy most likely to help the Soviets overcome one of their most serious problems—the unreliability of East European forces:

[I]f NATO appeared to be launching a counter-attack against Eastern Europe,

[30] Rene Nyberg, *Security Dilemmas in Scandinavia: Evaporated Nuclear Options and Indigenous Conventional Capabilities*, Occasional Paper No. 17, Cornell University Peace Studies Program (Ithaca, NY: 1983).

these forces might fight seriously in self-defence. If war had been started by miscalculation or as a result of a border incident, there might even be East European suspicion that the West had manufactured an excuse to launch an attack eastward; while this might be seen as a chance for liberation from the Soviet Union, it might equally be viewed with serious alarm. Moreover, if Eastern Europe is a potential friend, it is politically undesirable to wreak destruction in East European territory, quite the reverse. (p. 158)

The Commission's members are particularly sensitive to the danger that long-range strike aircraft and missiles—central to Deep Strike strategies—could induce Soviet preemption in time of crisis. They recognize a certain military utility in deploying such weapons but do not feel that it outweighs the risks. They believe that if "priority is given to reducing tension and the possibility of war by miscalculation, it may make most sense to concentrate on purely defensive capability against air attack," combining surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and high-altitude fighter interceptors.

The Commission finds several of the other proposed options unsatisfactory. It dismisses the option of a conventional force buildup, because it is likely to provoke a new arms race in conventional forces and is probably not practical on economic or political grounds. It also rejects the notion of simply replacing NATO nuclear weapons with conventional ones and retaining the present "forward defense" strategy for two reasons. First, the strategy is heavily dependent on defeating an attack through attrition of Soviet forces and consequently relies too much on U.S. reinforcements. This reliance is considered undesirable for a Western Europe trying to move toward greater independence from the United States; moreover, it is not clear that the United States would be willing to fight a long conventional war in Europe without resorting to nuclear weapons. Second, this option does not take advantage of the opportunity that denuclearizing Western Europe offers for a major rethinking of NATO's overall military strategy with all its political implications.

The members of the Commission find many aspects of the remaining options worthy of serious consideration, and their concluding proposal constitutes a mix of these four. They consider a strategy of "defensive deterrence" the most sensible politically: "If the primary purpose of restructuring NATO forces and strategy is to promote prospects for disengagement, disarmament and the eventual dismantling of the military blocs in Europe, then there is a strong political case for adopting weapons and deployment which denote more clearly a purely defensive stance" (p. 167). For military reasons, the Commission believes some form of frontier defense, perhaps a multinational force, should be retained and territorial defense forces expanded. The members point out that strategies of in-depth, dispersed defense and "defensive deterrence" rely on advanced technology weapons, such as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for anti-tank defense; the

Commission demonstrates an impressive command of the main issues in the debate over anti-tank weapons and is well aware of their limitations. While warning against an overreliance on such weapons, the Commission does believe that they can play an important role in a defensively-oriented strategy.

Nuclear Blackmail and "Fall-Back Strategies"

The main criticism that is usually lodged against proposals for non-nuclear defense is that they subject the countries adopting such a defense to "nuclear blackmail." Some members of the European Security Study believe that the Soviet Union is already using its military power to intimidate Western Europe. But if Soviet forces are intended for political blackmail, why does Soviet behavior not reflect this intention? Soviet statements renouncing military superiority in favor of "parity," and commenting on the need to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war seem more intended to reassure than intimidate the West. Why this apparent contradiction? ESECS member Hannes Adomeit argues that the Soviets no longer need explicitly to employ their military power for political purposes. "In the course of the 1970s the necessity of openly invoking Soviet strength was largely becoming obsolete" because of the increasing unsolicited attention it received from "Western publications, official and non-official."

But Adomeit's logic is somewhat faulty. It is difficult to remember a time in the postwar period when the Soviets had a "necessity of openly invoking" their strength, for lack of people in the West willing to do it for them. In fact, the most notable examples of the Soviets' trying to get political capital out of their military power occurred when they were relatively at their weakest—during the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" scares of the late 1950s and early 1960s. No doubt the Soviets were encouraged in these efforts by the obsessive attention the threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail received in Western publications at that time. This has led George Kennan to observe that "It takes two to make a successful act of intimidation; and the very improbability of the actual use of these weapons means that no one in Western Europe needs to be greatly intimidated by them unless he wishes to be."[31] Based on a similar insight, Dieter Senghaas asks, "What is the moral[ity] of a political leadership if it . . . in advance declares itself open to political pressure? The scandal of the statement lies in the fact that it implies . . . political bankruptcy."[32]

The members of the Alternative Defence Commission are well aware

[31] George F. Kennan, "Zero Options," *New York Review of Books*, May 12, 1983.

[32] Dieter Senghaas, "Questioning Some Premises of the Current Security Debate in Europe," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1981, p. 323.

that present Soviet nuclear capabilities are far greater than they were in earlier years, and could pose a threat to a nuclear-disarmed Europe. They do not avoid addressing the risk of nuclear blackmail. But just as a non-nuclear defense presents certain risks, so too do current policies of nuclear deterrence. Thus, the Commission argues that it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of risk.

> The risk that is inherent and unavoidable in a policy of mutual nuclear deterrence is an eventual holocaust. The inherent risk for a country or alliance which unconditionally refuses to resort to weapons of mass destruction is nuclear blackmail followed by political defeat or occupation, or possibly a limited nuclear attack which the opponent might launch to show they were not bluffing. This is not to say nuclear blackmail is a necessary or likely outcome of unilateral nuclear disarmament or of a decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, but simply to acknowledge that the danger is there. But equal frankness on the part of the proponents of nuclear deterrence would lead them to acknowledge that their policy involves not only the risk of an eventual holocaust but a willingness to participate in the unleashing of it. (p. 46)

The Alternative Defence Commission's proposals for deterring Soviet nuclear escalation and blackmail are far more responsible and sensible than the current policy, which threatens mutual annihilation. The Commission refers to these as "fall-back strategies," because they are intended for use in the extremely unlikely event that "defensive deterrence" and conventional defense efforts fail to prevent a Soviet invasion and occupation. The fall-back strategies, in combination with a strong, non-provocative defense, should serve to deter such actions in the first place, but unlike nuclear deterrence, their possible failure will not result in a nuclear holocaust.

The Commission's preferred fall-back strategy for defeating a foreign occupation is civil resistance.[33] According to the authors, "Defence by civil resistance" aims "to deprive any illicit or occupation regime of [its] basis of social power"—"the co-operation, or at least the compliance, of the majority of the population"—"to encourage international sanctions against an aggressor, and to seek support among the population, or within particular circles, in the aggressor state." Advanced preparation and training are essential to the concept. Several of the members of the Commission apparently favored civil resistance as a full substitute for conventional defense, but viewed "defensive deterrence" as a transitory step towards a non-violent defense posture.[34] Thus the Commission devoted considerable

[33] The Commission's study of this topic owes much to the work of Gene Sharp, in particular his three-volume *Politics of Non-Violent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973); and his more recent *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980).

[34] See the discussion by the Commission's coordinator, Michael Randle, "Constructing Defensive Strategies," in *ADIU Report* (March/April 1983), pp. 1–4.

attention to the use of civil resistance to fulfill a number of defense requirements, and even addressed the question of forming a European Treaty Organization of states committed to non-violent defense and an international Non-violent Action Corps to come to the aid of countries facing aggression.

As long-term objectives, these proposals are worth pursuing. For the near future, a policy of "defensive deterrence," combining a strong, defensively-oriented military posture with the threat of non-violent civil resistance, would make Europe more secure than the present policy of nuclear deterrence or any shift to an offensive Deep Strike strategy.

Alternative European Futures

The Alternative Defence Commission clearly has in mind a broad agenda for change, one aspect of which envisages a trend toward greater reliance on non-violent means of defense, in order to increase the prospects for cooperation and a reduction of tensions in Europe. In contrast, the European Security Study's long-term vision for Europe is a maintenance of the military and political status quo between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or better yet a restoration of the lost "cohesion" that NATO is believed to have possessed in the past and a securing of some kind of advantage over the East.

When considering the effects of their proposal on the Soviet Union—strictly in military terms—the ESECS authors reveal that they envisage more than just maintenance of the status quo in Europe. Donald Cotter, for example, predicts that NATO conventional forces "will be vastly improved" and that "long-range targeting and strike capabilities will put at risk the majority of Soviet follow-on and reserve forces." He emphasizes, "*This would be a qualitatively new threat to the Red Army*," and postulates that "the trend in the correlation-of-forces in their favor in conventional and nuclear forces would be stopped and perhaps reversed." Cotter predicts that a "massive reappraisal of [Soviet] forces, doctrine, and strategy to cope with NATO's new deterrence and defense options would be necessary" (p. 249).

The ESECS members hope that their proposals will force the Soviets into an arms race, including a major restructuring of their forces at great expense. This hope springs from the authors' understanding of the past NATO-Warsaw Pact arms race dynamic. They believe that NATO's past initiatives, such as the massive deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950s and the implementation of "flexible response" in the 1960s, forced the Soviets to restructure their forces to NATO's advantage. The authors somehow miss the significance of the fact that this very Soviet

restructuring led to the new "threat" (the practice of echeloning forces) that the ESECS proposals are now intended to counter. One can already foresee the dangerous consequences of the ESECS proposals. The *least* dangerous outcome would be, as Peter Stratmann warns in his supporting paper, that the Soviets will introduce Deep Strike weapons (conventionally-armed ballistic missiles or cruise missiles) in massive quantities into *their* forces and pose an even greater offensive threat to NATO. The more dangerous possibilities are those already discussed in this essay—the risk of preemption in times of crisis, and subsequent war by miscalculation.

The Alternative Defence Commission's proposals—short- and long-term—are intended to reduce these risks and move beyond the dangers of the status quo in Europe. For the short term, the Commission favors "the removal of battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons and the adoption of a no-first-use of nuclear weapons agreement." Broader aims include "the demilitarization of East and West Germany, the creation of nuclear-free zones intended eventually to cover the whole of Europe, the eventual disbandment of the two military alliances in Europe and the encouragement of detente and disarmament" (p. 275).

The Commission focuses most of its attention on implementing its goals unilaterally. The Report does recommend that attempts should be "made at every stage to reach agreement with the Soviet Union for the mutual withdrawal of nuclear weapons, but if necessary NATO [should] take these initiatives unilaterally" (p. 276). Other references to negotiating with the Soviet Union appear from time to time throughout the Commission's report, but it is clear that the members feel the prospects for positive change are far better through unilateralism. This is not surprising considering the dismal results of years of negotiations on security issues in Europe. Nevertheless, it is possible that the prospects for successful negotiations with the Soviets would actually improve if the British and Western European governments ever come to share the goals of the Alternative Defence Commission.

Two of the Commission's main goals, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the mutual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, have long been included in Soviet proposals for European security agreements.[35] In the past, there has been no way of assessing the degree of Soviet seriousness in presenting these proposals because Western governments have always

[35] For a consideration of Soviet proposals, see Ulrich Albrecht's discussion in *Disarming Europe* (fn. 6), pp. 143–161; for a Soviet treatment, see A.A. Roschchin, *Mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnosti i iadernoe oruzhie* [International security and nuclear weaponry] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1980), pp. 198–200. For detailed coverage of recent Soviet proposals, see the *Arms Control Reporter* (Brookline, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, monthly).

been opposed to them. It is only appropriate, then, that European peace activists should be pressuring their governments to test Soviet intentions through multilateral negotiations.

Multilateral agreements might help resolve some issues that the Alternative Defence Commission has not sufficiently addressed—the role of a nuclear-armed France in a non-nuclear European defense alliance, and the problem of convincing the West German government, long a staunch supporter of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. One could argue that by the time a government committed to nuclear disarmament is elected in Britain the same could happen elsewhere in Europe. The possibility seems plausible for West Germany, but not particularly for France. Thus an item that should appear high on the agenda of the European peace movement is forging ties with disarmament advocates in France and together devising strategies for the French to play a positive role in the transition to a non-nuclear, defensively-oriented Europe.[36] The Soviets might have an incentive to cooperate in such a transition if they foresaw a reduction in the nuclear threat posed by French and British arsenals and a lessened role for the United States in Europe. In any case, it would not take long for governments truly committed to nuclear disarmament in Europe to ascertain whether or not the Soviets were equally committed.

Another long-term goal of West European governments committed to policies of "defensive deterrence" would be to try to convince the Soviets to adopt a similar policy. Based on the historical legacy of Soviet use of force against Eastern Europe, the prospects do not seem good. But if the Alternative Defence Commission's goal, of securing for the countries of Eastern Europe "a far greater measure of political and economic independence than they now have" (p. 263), is at all attainable, it is only through restricting Soviet political and military intervention there. A Western Europe adhering to a policy of "defensive deterrence" stands a far better chance of achieving this goal than does one threatening nuclear retaliation and deep strikes against East European and Soviet territory.

Unilateral initiatives have an extremely important role to play in moving Europe and the world away from the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. Nevertheless, the type of unilateral initiatives represented by the proposals of the European Security Study should be avoided at all cost. They threaten to decrease stability and heighten tensions in Europe, and thus make war—conventional and nuclear—more likely. The unilateral proposals of the Alternative Defence Commission, on the other hand, hold considerable

[36] There is already some support in France for a non-nuclear, non-aligned policy. See, for example, Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, *Le devoir de parler* (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1981); and the essays in Alain Joxe, ed., *Demain la guerre?* (Paris: Editions ouvrieres, 1981).

potential for reducing the nuclear threat to Europe and moving toward greater political cooperation and reconciliation. They should be combined with renewed efforts toward multilateral agreements limiting offensive forces and encouraging adoption of "defensive deterrence" as the predominant military posture in Europe. Such a process holds the promise of bringing greater security to all the countries of Europe, East and West.