

with the Politburo. Nine of the twelve secretaries are new, and a clear majority are close allies of Gorbachev.

Beyond question there has been a qualitative improvement in the leadership. Overall, the newcomers are better-educated, more open-minded and younger than those whose places they have taken. The element of rejuvenation is clear. Taking the top leadership team as a whole, the average age has dropped from 67.5 to 62.2.

The personnel change and policy innovation that have taken place under Gorbachev are equally impressive. For many in the West, and some in the Soviet Union, who assumed that the country was both monolithic and unchanging, this must have come as a shock. Gorbachev is a politician with ideas and even ideals, but he knows how to handle the levers of power. The boldness of some of the innovation has earned him enemies as well as friends in the Soviet elite, and it is still viewed warily by many a Soviet citizen. His position is not totally secure and could not be, given the extent of the changes he is trying to introduce. Yet the odds are that not only will he stay in office but that he will go on to consolidate his power further. When that happens, there is a real chance that the Gorbachev era will become the most constructive time of improvement in Soviet history. □

■ GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

'New Thinking' in Foreign Policy

MATTHEW EVANGELISTA

VI. Lenin once said that "there is no more erroneous or harmful idea than the separation of foreign from internal policy." Ironically, the link between foreign and domestic affairs has traditionally been used by Western cold-warriors to underline their accusations of Soviet expansionism. It may seem surprising, then, that Mikhail Gorbachev himself has argued that the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy depends on making Soviet society more democratic. Speaking at the international peace forum in Moscow in February, Gorbachev called attention to the "revolutionary transformations" taking place in his country, to the need for a "wide democratization of the entire life of the society." He declared that a fair assessment of Soviet foreign policy required an understanding of the goals of domestic reform. "More than ever before," Gorbachev said, "our international policy depends on our internal policy."

In certain respects Gorbachev does appear to have adopted some of the assumptions of his harshest critics. U.S. op-

Matthew Evangelista teaches Soviet and world politics at the University of Michigan. He is the author of Innovation and the Arms Race, forthcoming from Cornell University Press.

RUSSIA—MONGOLIA SIBERIA—TRANS-SIBERIAN RR 24 DAYS TOUR #SM1 FROM \$3299

DEPARTS FROM NEW YORK
APRIL THROUGH SEPTEMBER

MOSCOW	DAYS 4	IRKUTSK	DAYS 3
TASHKENT	2	ULAN BATOR	3
KHABAROVSK	2	GOBI DESERT	2
TRANS-SIBERIAN	3	LENINGRAD	3

ALL MEALS, ALL TRANSPORTATION

3 VISITS TO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

5 CULTURAL PERFORMANCES

4 IN RUSSIA, 1 IN MONGOLIA

2 OVERNIGHTS IN A YURT (GOBI DESERT)

SPECIAL VISITS: AMUR BOAT RIDE, LAKE BAIKAL,

HERMITAGE, PETRODVORETS

GALA FAREWELL DINNER IN MOSCOW

PROGRESSIVE WORLD TOURS

DEPT N

(305) 427-4779

PHONE OR WRITE

4003 ISLEWOOD DR.

DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33442

MANY OTHER TOURS. WE ARE SPECIALISTS IN
RUSSIA***CHINA***AROUND THE WORLD TRAVEL

Central Asia

PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TOUR 21 DAYS

DEPARTS	AUGUST 16	\$2895
FROM	AUGUST 23	\$2895
NEW YORK	★OCTOBER 25	\$2595

MOSCOW	DAYS 3	ALMA ATA	DAYS 2
SAMARKAND	2	EREVAN	3
BUKHARA	2	TBILISI	2
TASHKENT	2	LENINGRAD	3

A SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP
TOURIST PROGRAM HAS
BEEN ARRANGED FOR
EACH CITY ON THIS TOUR

DELUXE MEALS, FIRST CLASS HOTELS, ALL "MUST"
SIGHTS VISITED. EXCURSIONS FROM LENINGRAD,
ALMA ATA, EREVAN, TBILISI.
FOUR THEATER PERFORMANCES
THREE VISITS TO SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS
FOUR GALA DINNER PARTIES

★ YOU WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

PROGRESSIVE WORLD TOURS

DEPT N

(305) 427-4779

PHONE OR WRITE

4003 ISLEWOOD DR.

DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33442

MANY OTHER TOURS. WE ARE SPECIALISTS IN
RUSSIA***CHINA***AROUND THE WORLD TRAVEL

ponents of arms control treaties, for example, frequently raise the specter of Soviet cheating by asking, How can we trust a government that doesn't trust its own people? In the wake of the release of Andrei Sakharov and scores of other political prisoners, Gorbachev has responded to those critics on their own terms. One consequence of the domestic reforms has been a marked "strengthening of trust in our society," he said at the peace forum. "And this has strengthened our confidence in the possibility of bringing the necessary trust into the sphere of interstate and international relations as well." Finally, he stressed the importance of having Soviet citizens, not just politicians and diplomats, take part in the process of building mutual trust.

Gorbachev's words have been greeted with mixed reactions in the West. Surely, a certain amount of skepticism is warranted, especially on the matter of internal changes in the regime's attitude toward its people. The government's continued suspicion of contact with foreigners and its reluctance to allow unsanctioned political activity bar the kind of independent "citizen diplomacy" that Gorbachev claims to endorse. Yet whatever the conjunction of internal causes, the consequences for Soviet foreign policy are exactly as Gorbachev describes: an increased confidence, a willingness to take risks in pursuit of accommodation, and a creative approach to dealing with international relations that is unparalleled in recent Soviet history.

Gorbachev's foreign policy since becoming General Secretary, in March 1985, has been characterized by flexibility,

sophistication and a high level of energy. He has emphasized independent relations with countries in Western Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific, while keeping the door open to agreements with the United States. In the area of arms control he has made substantial concessions and has shown a remarkable degree of unilateral restraint. Most important, he has recast the internal debate on the meaning of security, by accentuating political, diplomatic and economic concerns over strictly military ones.

In implementing his foreign policy, Gorbachev has sought to overcome Leonid Brezhnev's legacy of conservatism and inertia. One particularly revealing symbol of the stagnation that beset Soviet foreign policy in the waning years of the Brezhnev regime was the Foreign Ministry itself. It had been directed since 1957 by Andrei Gromyko, and its organizational structure reflected the world of three decades earlier. Responsibility for relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, for example, rested with the British desk, as if the sun had not yet set on the empire. Emblematic of Gorbachev's changes was the "promotion" of Gromyko to the largely ceremonial position of President and the rearrangement of the ministry under Eduard Shevardnadze. Organizationally, Australia and New Zealand became part of a new Pacific department; Canada was moved to North America; and Britain finally joined Europe.

The structural changes are reflected in the substance of policy as well. Shevardnadze, the first Soviet Foreign Minister to visit Indonesia and Vietnam, has traveled throughout

New from AAUG Press

It's No Secret: Israel's Military Involvement in Central America

by Milton Jamail and Margo Gutierrez

A thoroughly documented account of how Israel supplies weapons, ammunition, military technology and counterinsurgency aid to Central American regimes and movements.

ISBN 0-937694-69-X Monograph 20 1986 117 pages \$10.00

"A critically needed resource to understand the complex and virtually unknown proxy role that Israel plays in U.S.-Central American relations."

—Charlie Clements, M.D., author of *Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador*

Resource Guide to the Arab World (forthcoming)*

compiled by Audrey Shabbas

This comprehensive guide to films, video cassettes, filmstrips and other educational materials on the Arab world, including the sources from which they may be obtained, is a must for anyone who needs accurate educational materials about Arab culture, society, history, and politics (available November 1987).

ISBN 0-937694-74-6 1987 50 pages (approx.) \$6.95

*20% discount on orders received before Oct. 15, 1987.

50% discount for AAUG members on both titles.

Please send your order and payment to AAUG Press, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 556 Trapelo Rd., Belmont, MA 02178; tel.: (617) 484-5483. Postage and handling: \$1.50 for 1st book, 50¢ each additional book.

Membership information and free catalog of publications available on request.

BUILDING THE GREEN MOVEMENT A National Conference for a New Politics

July 2-7, 1987

Amherst, Massachusetts

Workshops, Discussions, Green Alternatives Fair, Speakers:

- Grassroots Democracy • Community Empowerment • Nonviolent Direct Action • Independent Politics • Economic Justice • Cooperative Economics • Labor • Eco-Feminism • Anti-Racism • Rainbow from Below • No Nukes • Public Power • Peace • Disarmament • Detente from Below • Eco-Technologies • Organic Agriculture • Renewable Energy • Recycling • Farm Survival • Rural Reconstruction • Eco-Communities • Bioregionalism • Green Children's Congress • Games • Clowns • Music • Frank Annunzio New Haven Green Party, Conn. • Aolke Banderage Sri Lankan writer & activist • Grace Lee Boggs & James Boggs National Organization for an American Revolution • Murray Bookchin Burlington Greens, Vermont • Kathy Christensen Labor-Farm Party, Wisc. • Julie Dittus Speaker, West German Greens • Fernando Gabeira Brazilian Green Party • Ynesia King Feminist Peace Institute • Winona LaDuke Chippewa • Joanne Landy Campaign for Peace & Democracy/East & West • Olga Medvedkov Moscow Trust Group • John Mohawk Seneca • Grace Paley writer & peace activist • and more

Sponsored by the Committees of Correspondence, a national confederation of local Green groups. For registration information, call (802) 295-1344, or write to: National Green Gathering Working Group, c/o New England Committees of Correspondence, P.O. Box 703, White River Junction, Vermont 05001

SUBSCRIBER SERVICES

MOVING?

Send both your old mailing label and your new address to:

THE NATION
P.O. Box 1953
Marion, OH 43305

Please allow 4-6 weeks for processing.

QUESTIONS?

If you have any problems or questions regarding your subscription, please write to us at the address to the left, or call:

(614) 383-3141

8:00 am to 4:30 pm EST

noncommunist Asia, promoting trade and improved relations. Gorbachev has made overtures to the Pacific, presenting proposals for a nuclear-free zone that appeal to anti-nuclear sentiments there, especially in New Zealand and Australia. He has also tried to improve relations with China by making territorial concessions, having accepted the Chinese position on a disputed border along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. The two countries continue their talks on political normalization, and in July 1986, Gorbachev announced a sizable withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and offered to negotiate mutual troop reductions.

In relation to Europe, Gorbachev has sought to free Soviet policy from the almost obsessive emphasis on the U.S.-Soviet relationship that characterized the Brezhnev era. He has developed a personal rapport with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; he has expressed respect for France's independence in military matters, even though currently that means a French nuclear buildup; and he has encouraged contacts between West Germany's opposition Social Democrats and East Germany's Socialist Unity Party, aimed at limiting chemical weapons and establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. His proposals for reducing conventional forces in Europe should interest those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that, for financial and demographic reasons, find it difficult to meet existing military commitments.

Gorbachev's policy toward the Third World marks another distinct break from the Brezhnev approach. On the

rhetorical level, Soviet support for national liberation movements has changed from promises of economic and military assistance to expressions of "profound sympathy," in the words of the new edition of the Communist Party Program, which sets guidelines for future policy. The Gorbachev leadership seems interested in fostering relations more with Western-oriented Third World regimes, such as Mexico and Saudi Arabia, than with those that espouse Marxist-Leninist philosophies, such as Ethiopia and Mozambique. Soviet relations with India serve as a model, and Gorbachev received a warm reception on his visit there last fall. He will make a long-awaited tour of the Latin American continent this fall, the first for a Soviet leader. Gorbachev may use the trip to highlight those Soviet efforts in the region that are highly pragmatic: forging diplomatic links and expanding trade relations and development assistance programs. That emphasis may explain Gorbachev's reluctance to commit the Soviet Union to the defense of Nicaragua against the threat from the United States, and reflect his apparent concern that superpower conflicts in the Third World could escalate out of control.

Yet sensitivity to the potential for conflict with the United States is not the sole, or even the primary, reason behind the change in Soviet policy. The impetus appears to be economic. The Stalinist model of rapid industrialization has not achieved notable successes in its export version. The case of Cuba illustrates the dilemma: its economy is maintained with the help of Soviet subsidies estimated at the equivalent

What's the big surprise for this summer's travel season?

The Soviet Union!

WHO SAYS SO? THE NEW YORK TIMES-AND LOTS OF OTHERS...NOW YOU CAN SEE THE SOVIET UNION FOR YOURSELF...SEND FOR ANNIVERSARY TOURS' JUST-OFF-THE-PRESS 1987 BROCHURE!

You don't have to be in the travel business to know that today there's a tremendous new interest in the Soviet Union, its people, its leaders and its way of life.

Examples: "Space Bridge" radio and television shows. Increasing US-USSR cultural exchanges. And this spring, the only regular issue **People** magazine has ever devoted to a single subject was about the **Soviet Union**. Now that's what you call reflecting a trend!

Of course, we're not surprised by the upsurge of travel to the Soviet Union. As specialists in travel to the USSR for the last twenty years, Anniversary Tours has watched the numbers grow. 1987 will see the greatest single-year increase in tourism to the Soviet Union in history.



"What is the early surprise for the summer season? It is the Soviet Union, where trips... are up 25%"
The New York Times, April 14, 1987

Call us today at
(800) 223-1336
In New York State call
(212) 245-7501

ANNIVERSARY TOURS

250 W. 57th St., New York, N. Y. 10107

We've got some hot new tours this year: Our 10-day **Russian Adventure** takes in Moscow and Leningrad. **Northern Capital Cities** goes to Riga and Tallinn, plus Moscow and Leningrad. **Southern Capital Cities** visits Kishinev, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad.

Our exciting new 24-page brochure is brim-full of travel surprises. We are offering unique people-to-people tours to many regions of the Soviet Union, from Siberia to Central Asia to the Soviet Far East - and much more!

We still have some openings, but they are filling up fast. Obviously, time is growing short, so write or call us today!

of several million dollars a day. In trying to account for the model's shortcomings, Soviet academic specialists on the Third World have increasingly returned to traditional Marxist conceptions of development. They argue that poor countries with "feudal" systems of peasant-based agriculture have to pass through a capitalist phase before they are ready for socialism. The Soviet Union now advises its allies in the Third World to remain integrated in the capitalist world economy rather than jump directly to socialism. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself has moved in that direction, seeking to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and passing laws intended to encourage foreign investment.

The change in approach toward the Third World undoubtedly has a political motivation as well. The Reagan Administration's rhetoric about the Soviet Union as the source of all conflict in the world has touched a nerve among Soviet leaders, who prefer to present themselves as a force for peace and stability. The Soviet Union's offer to work with the West in combating terrorism should be seen in that light. Its renewed interest in convening an international conference on the Middle East may also indicate a change in attitude about the problems in that region. One important sign of a shift is the movement, albeit erratic, toward improving relations with Israel. Meanwhile, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Oman and the United Arab Emirates indicates a desire to break the diplomatic isolation in the Moslem world that followed the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.


The Afghan war remains a barrier not only to an improved Soviet image abroad but, more crucially, to efforts aimed at decreasing the military involvement of both superpowers in the developing world. Some prominent Soviet officials now appear interested in pursuing the idea of mutual restraints on armed intervention in the Third World. Last summer Anatoly Dobrynin, the recently appointed Central Committee secretary for foreign affairs and former Ambassador to the United States, made a number of constructive proposals in the influential party journal *Kommunist*. He wrote of the need to establish "norms of behavior" to limit military actions and to regulate regional conflicts that could escalate into world war. He proposed that the superpowers renounce the use of force in international relations, so as to create a climate of trust that would permit the resolution of local conflicts by diplomatic and political, rather than military, means. But the words ring hollow as long as the Soviet Army remains in Afghanistan.

Gorbachev gives every indication of wanting to get out of that war. In his speech to the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, in February 1986, he characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" and vowed "to withdraw the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its government." The prospects for doing so hardly seem bright, however, despite some progress in recent negotiations sponsored by the United Nations. Soviet attempts at securing a cease-fire have not met with success. Clearly, some new thinking on Afghanistan is in order, although much of it must be done in Washington. Many U.S. offi-

cials are content simply to let the wound bleed, oblivious to the risks of a spreading infection.

The Soviet leaders have tried to persuade the United States of their interest in improving relations, despite the Reagan Administration's obstructionism, by making concessions on arms control. Their unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing lasted for more than a year and a half, even as the United States exploded more than twenty-six nuclear devices. Beyond that they refrained from testing antisatellite weapons, and they agreed to unprecedented measures of on-site inspection to verify compliance with arms agreements, including the presence of U.S. scientists with seismic monitoring equipment adjacent to Soviet nuclear test ranges.

In return for those concessions the Soviet Union has sought a commitment from the United States not to violate



the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty by deploying the Star Wars system. But President Reagan seems to have become more intransigent on the issue the more Gorbachev has offered concessions. Gorbachev accepted the "zero option," agreeing to remove SS-20 missiles targeted at Europe without first resolving the Star Wars issue. The weapons that those SS-20s were originally intended to counter—U.S. forward-based nuclear-armed aircraft and the growing French and British arsenals—would remain. In response the Administration hardened its stance on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Rather than put off deployment for ten years, as the President proposed at Reykjavik, the Administration now insists on deploying a Star Wars system starting in 1994, even though no one believes an effective defense could be implemented that early, if ever. Nevertheless, Gorbachev has refused, as he puts it, to "slam the door." He has accepted additional conditions appended by

the United States to the zero option and has expressed a willingness to discuss allowing Star Wars research to be conducted beyond the laboratory phase.

Gorbachev has evidently come under some criticism at home for his conciliatory approach to the United States. The end of the testing moratorium and the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan indicate the limits of his ability to maneuver. On the whole, though, Gorbachev seems to be in a relatively strong position to continue pushing Soviet policy in the direction of moderation. Here, ironically, his words have assumed even greater importance than his deeds. Perhaps Gorbachev's main contribution to the new thinking on Soviet foreign policy has been the way in which he has reframed the debate on national security. He has broadened the definition to downplay the military component while stressing the role of politics, diplomacy and, above all, economic strength. Yet, it is unclear how far he can go without some reciprocation from the American side.

Gorbachev has implemented a number of important internal changes so that Soviet security will no longer be dominated by strictly military concerns. First, he replaced several senior commanders. Second, he has attempted to break the military's monopoly on expertise in the security field by encouraging civilian academics to become involved in this area. Dobrynin apparently has set up a section of his Central Committee department to act as an alternative source of military advice. In considering how the Soviet Union should respond to Star Wars without developing a costly system of its own, Gorbachev has relied on civilian experts in the Academy of Sciences, primarily Yevgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev.

Like many of his predecessors, Gorbachev fears that the United States is attempting "to undermine the U.S.S.R. economically by means of an arms race," as he told the Czechoslovak newspaper *Rude Pravo*. "We will do everything so as not to allow this malicious plan to come true," he asserted. If the Soviet Union is weak economically, Gorbachev argued, "the pressure from the enemies of socialism intensifies." But, if "we become stronger, more solid economically, and on the social and political level, the interest of the capitalist world in normal relations with us will grow."

In speeches to both domestic and foreign audiences Gorbachev has made clear the link between security and economic reform. At home he has emphasized that political reform may be a prerequisite to the success of his economic policies. As he told an audience of Soviet writers in July 1986, "Unless we involve the people, nothing will come out of it." Does Gorbachev really believe that this process of internal democratization will have an effect on Soviet foreign policy? His remarks to another group of writers the previous month—intended to be off the record but leaked to a Western newspaper by one of the participants—leave no doubt. "Our enemies have discovered our secret," he said, "Our nuclear capability does not frighten them. They won't start a war. One thing causes them anxiety: if democracy develops in the Soviet Union, if we succeed, then

we will win." Gorbachev evidently attributes the mixed reception to his new thinking in foreign policy to Western ambivalence about the long-term implications of a more moderate, economically vigorous and democratic Soviet Union. He may be right. □

■ GORBACHEV'S GAMBLE

A New Deal for Eastern Europe

A. JAMES MCADAMS

Until recently the conservative leaders of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria dealt with their critics by throwing them in jail, confiscating their publications or forcing some troublemakers into exile. But now that Mikhail Gorbachev has stepped into the critics' ranks, that approach is no longer so easy. His call for candor in politics, economic reform and cultural liberalization has thrown into disarray those Eastern European regimes that once depended on the Soviet Union to act as a bulwark against change.

Indeed, far from rushing to embrace Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*, some of these governments have subtly mobilized their resources against the Soviet leader. After Gorbachev articulated his plan for democratic electoral reform in a highly publicized speech at the Central Committee Plenum on January 27 and proposed the introduction of secret ballots and multiple candidates in Soviet elections, copies of *Pravda* containing the speech were suddenly withdrawn from public distribution in Prague. In East Germany, which has a longstanding policy of reprinting the speeches of Soviet leaders, the official press published only a cursory summation of Gorbachev's remarks. Clearly, there are influential politicians in Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, who will do everything they can to shield their positions and privileges from the new wave of reform.

Only in the past few months has Gorbachev addressed the question of changing Moscow's historically dictatorial relationship with Eastern Europe. But from his first days in office he recognized that his country was dealing with states that are now more nearly the equals of the Soviet Union than in the past, each possessing a greater sense of its own rights and entitlements. Hence, more than any of his predecessors, Gorbachev has maintained regular communication with members of the bloc, in order to "learn to prevent a collision of interests of the various socialist countries," as he put it at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress. He still adheres, however, to the principle that his allies should ask not what the Soviet Union can do for them, but what they

A. James McAdams, the author of *East Germany and Detente: Building Authority After the Wall* (Cambridge University Press), teaches Soviet, Eastern European and German politics at Princeton University.

Copyright of Nation is the property of Nation Company, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.