butions of up to $250 are matched dollar-for-dollar by Federal money, he must agree to a "qualified campaign spending limit" of $10 million, plus an inflation increment using 1974 as the base year. The candidate may also accept up to $5,000 in contributions from each PAC, but these funds will not be matched by public funds. In the general election, a Presidential candidate who accepts matching funds may not accept either individual or PAC contributions for his campaign. (The candidate may, however, accept PAC money and individual contributions of up to $1,000 for the legal and accounting costs of complying with the law.) Thus the power of PAC money is felt mainly at the Congressional level, and that is where most legislative reform efforts are directed. But partial public funding of Presidential campaigns hasn't closed all the loopholes.

Those "independent committees" that Mondale mentioned are a case in point. These groups, like the National Conservative Political Action Committee, intervene in Presidential elections but do not give money directly to candidates. In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that campaign contributions are protected by the First Amendment and that PACs may finance campaign propaganda for or against a given candidate provided there is no direct communication or liaison between them. What is more, the Court held, there are no limits on the amount a PAC may spend, although contributions greater than $250 must be reported to the F.E.C.

Common Cause, a citizens' lobbying group, challenged the unlimited independent-expenditures concept in 1980, arguing that the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act allows each PAC to spend no more than $1,000 in behalf of each federally funded candidate. When the case came before the Supreme Court, the vote was split 4 to 4, and the F.E.C. has said it will follow the issue on a case-by-case basis. As an F.E.C. source pointed out, "A candidate shouldn't know about these expenditures [on his behalf], but they amount to a lot of money." Independent committees, then, can have an indirect influence on a candidate, since he will be aware of their support.

Voters may now watch what Hart, Askew, Mondale and any other PAC renouncers do in light of what they have said. Until recently, Mondale had his own PAC, the Committee for the Future of America, which raised more than $2 million last year to pay for his appearances in behalf of other Democratic candidates. According to Mondale's staff, not a penny of the $2 million his committee raised last year has been used for his Presidential campaign. Hart has accepted PAC money in his senatorial campaigns, but as his press secretary points out, until there is public funding for Congressional races, candidates who refuse PAC money are likely to be heavily outspent by their opponents—which is why Hart now calls for public financing of these races.

In short, though Hart, Mondale and Askew have political motives for eschewing PAC money, they have taken a public stand and raised the issue. They have made the gesture; now they must follow through and come up with legislative remedies for the current PAC epidemic. □

RUSSIA LOOKS WEST

The Myth of 'Hostage Europe'

MATTHEW A. EVANGELISTA

Since World War II, American leaders have interpreted Soviet military policy toward Europe in one of two ways. Either it is offensive and needs to be "deterred" by the United States, or it is offensive *in order* to deter the United States. The first interpretation I will call the Churchillian view since it was expressed most often and most eloquently by Winston Churchill when the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. For example: "It is indeed a melancholy thought that nothing preserves Europe from an overwhelming military attack except the devastating resources of the United States in this awful weapon." The Churchillian theory posits an implacably hostile Soviet Union that can be contained only by threat of nuclear annihilation. That is the prevailing view of the Reagan Administration.

The second view may be dubbed "Hostage Europe." It was first put forth by some American Sovietologists in the 1950s. They agreed that the Soviet Union's military policy was "offensively oriented," but they believed that its ultimate goal was defensive—to thwart the aggressive designs of Western imperialists. With regard to Europe, American proponents of that view argued that the Russians retained the capability of rapidly invading the Continent as a way of deterring a U.S. nuclear attack on their own country. Thus Western Europe was held hostage.*

After the Soviet Union acquired the bomb in 1949, it built missiles that could reach Europe, and the Hostage Europeanists argued that their theory still held—the missiles were a stopgap measure, making Europe a nuclear hostage until the Soviet Union had ICBMs capable of striking the United States. Yet after the Russians acquired long-range missiles, they built the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber and targeted them on "unarmed" Western Europe. The Russians were obviously not playing by the rules of the Hostage Europe theory. Its proponents duly recanted, and the Churchillian view won out.

Do these interpretations have a grounding in reality?

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*Hostage Europe was never a Soviet strategic view. It first appeared authoritatively in this country as a parody of a Soviet parody of U.S. policy. In his 1959 book, *War and the Soviet Union*, the noted RAND Corporation Sovietologist Herbert S. Dinerstein described a hypothetical war between the United States and the Soviet Union, citing as his source the famous Soviet historian Eugene Tarle. But Tarle's actual words, as quoted in *The New York Times*, April 8, 1947, show that he was describing "comment *from American military circles* . . . the polemic going on in the United States" [Emphasis added.]

History shows they do not. Let us first examine the Churchillian view. At the end of World War II not only Churchill but most Western leaders saw "an overwhelming military attack" by the Red Army as a major threat to Western Europe, one that justified a buildup of U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent as well as the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance, NATO. But according to now available evidence, the Red Army was incapable of launching such an attack. In 1946, the Central Intelligence Agency intercepted a Soviet communication from the commander of the armed forces, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, in which Zhukov reported that his troops were incapable of fighting. Recently declassified U.S. intelligence documents suggest why.

In the first place, the Red Army was demobilized in stages, starting the day after the war in Europe ended. The pace was quick, contrary to most U.S. accounts, but not quick enough for some of the conscripts. Soviet sources describe problems of morale and discipline and an epidemic of desertions.

Second, the Soviet troops remaining in Germany and Eastern Europe had little time to train for an invasion of the West. Many were assigned to the reparations program and spent all their time dismantling factories and plants in Germany and shipping the machinery to the Soviet Union. Many other Soviet soldiers in Germany and Eastern Europe in the early postwar years had military occupation duties, which meant carrying out Soviet policies of political control and repression. Soviet forces were also engaged in fighting armed antigovernment groups still active in the Ukraine and in the Baltic republics well into the 1950s.

Third, Soviet troops played a major role in the postwar reconstruction of their homeland, which had been devastated by the German invasion. Seventy thousand villages and 1,700 towns had to be rebuilt. Millions of land mines and bombs left by the retreating German Army had to be cleared away. This work was the main task of many Soviet soldiers during the early postwar years. Others worked on farms or in factories. Preparation for a blitzkrieg invasion of Western Europe was clearly not a priority.

Fourth, the Red Army simply did not have the capability to execute the rapid invasion feared by many in the West. As late as 1950, half of its transportation consisted of horse-drawn vehicles. Most roads, railways and bridges in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were destroyed or seriously damaged during the war, according to U.S. intelligence, and repairs proceeded slowly. The Russians dismantled much of the railway system in East Germany as part of their reparations program.

Moreover, Soviet forces were poorly equipped; they had World War II-vintage weaponry and were severely deficient in many areas of modern military technology, such as radar and jet engines. The balance of conventional forces in Europe during the early postwar years did not favor the Russians. Although common wisdom held that the thirty Soviet divisions on occupation duty in Eastern Europe were virtually unopposed and that the West was vastly outnumbered, it was not the case. The West did have fewer

divisions in Europe than the Russians, but each of its divisions had three times as many soldiers as a Soviet division. The balance in numbers of soldiers was about even then, and it still is today.

If Western Europeans had really feared a Soviet invasion in the late 1940s, they should have reinforced their troops in Europe. They certainly had plenty to spare for other purposes—such as colonialism. France, for example, had 100,000 troops fighting in Indochina in the late 1940s and another 100,000 in North Africa. Some 60,000 Dutch troops were stationed in Indonesia, while Belgium had 17,000 in the Congo. Instead of strengthening their conventional forces on the Continent, the Europeans relied on NATO and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."

It was not the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation that determined the size of Soviet conventional forces in Europe. Soviet occupation forces were not intended to offset the U.S. atomic bomb but to secure Eastern Europe as a buffer zone. In fact, as many contemporary observers remarked, the bomb made the buffer zone irrelevant.

The Hostage Europe theory does not explain the purpose of the large Soviet standing army in Europe, and it does no better with Soviet nuclear policy. Hostage Europeanists argue that once the Russians acquired the bomb, they viewed Europe as a nuclear hostage. The threat of an attack on it would serve to deter an American strike on Russia. It was presumed that Soviet nuclear bombers were targeted on European cities. Thus Paris was held hostage to protect Leningrad, London to protect Moscow and so forth.

This argument is unconvincing for a number of reasons. For one thing, despite the Soviet atomic test in 1949, the Soviet armed forces did not have nuclear weapons until 1954, after Stalin's death. Stalin would not let his generals even discuss the possible role of nuclear weapons in warfare, let alone deploy them. Soviet Tu-4 bombers (similar to U.S. B-29s) carried conventional bombs, and the thousand or so bombers deployed were most likely targeted on U.S. air bases in Britain and Western Europe and on other military facilities, which were the closest nuclear threats to the Soviet Union. In July 1948, during the Berlin blockade, the United States stationed "atomic capable" B-29 bombers at bases in England and Germany. By the end of the 1950s, there were some 1,400 B-47 jet bombers with nuclear weapons assigned to bases in Europe, North Africa and Okinawa, encircling the Soviet Union. The first Soviet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the Tu-16s, which became available in 1954, were certainly targeted on these forward-based U.S. strategic nuclear systems.

When Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles first appeared in the late 1950s, they replaced the less reliable bombers in targeting U.S. forward bases—not cities. The SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were not an "interim solution" until ICBMs were developed. They were deployed as a response to the nuclear threat posed by U.S. and NATO aircraft stationed in Europe. The Hostage Europe theory that the SS-4s and SS-5s were aimed at Europe as a temporary expedient until ICBMs capable of striking the United States could be developed is wrong. Even after the Russians had acquired the capability of hitting the North American continent, they continued to target new weapons on U.S. bases in Europe. They took the threat of a U.S. attack from Europe so seriously that they diverted a number of variable-range ICBMs—SS-11s—from intercontinental targets to European ones.

From the viewpoint of Soviet military planners, the nuclear threat from Europe increased in the 1960s. Britain and France deployed their "independent deterrents," and the United States expanded its force of land-based aircraft, submarine-based missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft on carriers. Yet when Soviet leaders demanded that these forward-based systems be placed on the agenda of arms control negotiations, the West refused. Faced by what it regarded as U.S. intransigence, the Soviet Union began deploying its newest missile—the SS-20—in 1977, as a replacement for the old and vulnerable SS-4s and SS-5s. The Hostage Europe theory could not explain the deployment, so the Reagan and Carter Administrations chose to view it from the perspective of Winston Churchill—as evidence of aggressive Soviet intentions. It makes more sense to see it as a reaction to U.S. military and arms control policies.

That is not to justify the emplacement of the SS-20s or to suggest that other factors, such as bureaucratic and technological inertia, did not contribute to their deployment. The Russians do not "need" the SS-20s. At current levels of nuclear overkill, more missiles do not mean more security. Europeans—East and West—are indeed held hostage, but the threat is of a superpower nuclear war taking place in their "theater." Europeans will only be free when their continent is free of nuclear weapons and the increasing militarization of East-West relations is reversed. □