

Review: Leading the Pact

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"in spite of its existence and our cognitive awareness of it, does not penetrate our human fantasy."

These attitudes, however, may be changing with the generations. Today's young people are the most seriously affected by the constant juxtaposition of terror and denial that colors modern life. As Doctors Mack and Beardslee wrote in their report, "The Impact on Children and Adolescents of Nuclear Developments," "youth do not resort mainly to denial and 'psychic shutdown.'" The adolescents studied by Drs. Mack and Beardslee in this volume accept nuclear war as inevitable. What they cannot comprehend is why their predecessors allowed atomic production in the first place, leaving successor generations in a world where:

planning seems pointless, and ordinary values and ideals appear naive. In such a context, impulsivity, a value system of 'get it now,' the hyperstimulation of drugs, and the proliferation of apocalyptic cults . . . seem like natural developments.

The doctors are stretching a point; philosophers since Plato have bemoaned the immorality of youth. Still, the unique psychological implications are inescapable. "I am constantly aware that any second the world might blow up in my face," responds one student, "It makes living more interesting."

Morbid fascination aside, this awareness is the key to reducing the nuclear threat. No problem can be solved if people refuse to think about it. Widespread public involvement, conclude the psychiatrists, is our only hope for peace:

We have found that it is essential to share the work with others and to work together in a group setting, rather than to work alone because of the awesomeness and the terrible pain of the questions involved.

These closing words hit the mark. While most people still do not fight—or even think about—the prospect of nuclear war, worldwide anti-nuclear protests may signal the end of an apathetic era. This report offers no explanation for the sudden spate of anti-nuclear activity. It does not even men-

tion the burgeoning "peace movement." The analyses and conclusion do, however, offer hints. Youth form the vanguard of the movement. To them, nuclear war is imaginable; it is no longer "in another realm." Catapulted from complacency by belligerent government statements and policies, and accidents like the 3-Mile Island meltdown, individuals are responding in a "survivor mission" manner, fighting nuclear developments to protect their futures. Intuitively, we have been following the doctors' orders—fear has united many in a concerted "rehumanization" effort. The trick is to keep that activity alive, to create a durable and thoughtful appreciation of nuclear issues, and to translate that public pressure into meaningful policy. This book's most significant contribution is its illustration of the mental defenses which promote popular apathy and give governments a free rein with the arms race. To be effective, the public must tread a mental tightrope between exasperating fear and enervating complacency, following instead a path marked by awareness and action.

Responsible information is the spur to effective public participation. Conceived to further the educational process, this report joins the work of physicians throughout the world who decry the nuclear build-up as the primary modern health hazard. Admittedly, psychiatrists are neither political scientists nor sociologists. Their emphasis on the nuclear bomb as the root cause of international tension and societal decay undervalues other sources of conflict inherent in our modern world. Nor does this report prescribe definitive solutions. It describes our psychological state, speculates on possible dangers, and fashions an agenda for future study, leaving the reader with as many questions as answers. What the doctors do provide, though, is an eloquent, if brief, diagnosis of the nuclear problem. We now face the rigorous task of finding the elusive cure—a new manner of thinking.

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## Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981)

### *Leading the Pact*

Matthew Evangelista

Is the Warsaw Pact primarily a military organization intended to meet a perceived threat from NATO, or is it more an instrument for maintaining Soviet political control in Eastern Europe? In his recent book, *Soviet Influence in Eastern*

*Europe*, Christopher Jones makes an argument for the latter interpretation. He claims that the system of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) military exercises established during the early 1960s by Soviet Marshal Grechko is intended (1) to prepare Pact armies for intervention against member states in the event that leaders loyal to Moscow lose power, and (2) to prevent WTO states from developing strategies of national territorial defense which would allow them to resist such intervention. The evidence as Jones presents it indicates that the forces of the WTO are better suited—and intentionally so—for intervening against their own member states than for fighting a war against NATO. In Jones' view, "preparation for war with NATO is not the primary purpose of the Pact exercises," or by implication, of the Pact itself. It is a compelling and controversial argument, and Jones musters a good deal of documentary evidence to support it.

For example, to support his claim that the Soviets want to prevent formation of strategies of territorial defense within

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the East European countries, Jones presents evidence from a number of cases. Since he perceives "control over the leaderships of East European parties as both the means and ends of Soviet policy toward East Europe," the cases Jones selects are those in which such control is threatened. In three of those cases—Yugoslavia (1948), Albania (1961), Romania (early 1960s)—the strategies of national territorial defense adopted by the countries involved served to deter Soviet military intervention. For the cases in which the Soviets did intervene militarily—Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968)—the decision to do so is attributed to the failure of the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks to pose a threat of serious military opposition. The case of the Polish uprising of 1956 constitutes a bit of an anomaly in Jones' classification scheme, in that the Poles made no serious attempt to formulate a strategy of national territorial defense (although there was some talk of establishing an independent "Polish Front" within the Warsaw Pact), yet they succeeded in deterring Soviet military intervention. The Poles did offer the Soviets the prospects of substantial armed opposition. However, Nikita Khrushchev, in his memoirs, claimed that he decided not to intervene militarily in Poland primarily because he realized that Polish leader Gomulka could be trusted not to pull out of the Warsaw Pact and thereby sever the only communications and supply route to Soviet forces in East Germany.


The Soviet concern, as expressed by Khrushchev, for military security receives little attention in Jones' work. He gives no consideration to the traditional notion of Eastern Europe as a Soviet "buffer zone." This is because he does not discuss the WTO in an international context, but only in the context of the "socialist commonwealth" (*sotsialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo*). By positing political control as the ultimate Soviet goal in Eastern Europe, Jones precludes the more common interpretation of what makes the Soviets decide to intervene in some cases but not in others: their perception of the relative security threat involved. Other possible explanations arise when the question is considered on an international level. Some observers have argued, for example, that the Soviets refrained from intervening militarily in Romania for fear of driving that country closer to China.

Jones' analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in Soviet military thinking suffers most from not considering the issue in international terms. Nuclear weapons in Soviet policy are seen as another means of enforcing control over Eastern Europe: "In the WTO exercises of the early 1960s, Marshal Grechko began to drill the armies of the Warsaw Pact for nuclear offense against the West in order to render them incapable of conventional defense against the East." Such a formulation ignores the extent to which Soviet nuclear weapons policies have developed as reactions to NATO initiatives. Nuclear weapons were first introduced into the Soviet armed forces in 1954, the year before the Warsaw Pact was formed, and many years before the system of joint exercises was instituted. At this time, the U.S. Strategic Air Command had thousands of bombers targeted on the Soviet Union from bases in Europe and elsewhere, and had begun equipping NATO armies with "tactical" nuclear weapons. The Soviets response was to arm its own forces with nuclear weapons, particularly its air forces, target NATO air bases and nuclear weapons stores, and develop a strategy that planned the destruction of U.S. nuclear weapons at the very outset of a war. Some analysts have pointed out that such an "offen-

sive," pre-emptive strategy was the only one open to the Soviets as long as the U.S. maintained a strategy of "massive retaliation." If the Soviets did not use their nuclear weapons in a "first strike," while NATO was preparing to use its nuclear weapons, they would have no weapons left for a "second strike." It was not a particularly hopeful or plausible strategy, but that is no reason to assume that it was intended more as a ruse to retain control of Eastern Europe than as a genuine response to a perceived threat from NATO.

When Jones does consider the influence of NATO on Soviet policy, he sees the Western alliance as a threat not to Soviet military security, but to Soviet political control of Eastern Europe. Thus nuclear weapons play an additional role in Soviet policy: "If NATO's armies are convinced that the Soviets are poised for an offensive nuclear war, NATO governments are unlikely to contemplate any military response to Soviet interventions against members of the Warsaw Pact." This rationale for Soviet nuclear weapons seems little different from the traditional notion of deterrence—that Soviet nuclear weapons are intended to dissuade NATO military action whether or not in response to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. It is not clear that Soviet leaders make any distinction. In regard to the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), for example, Jones argued in a recent article (ACT, March 1982) that the Soviets fear new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles because they provide counterforce capabilities that could limit the size and area of a nuclear war to Europe and the western U.S.S.R. and thereby "encourage NATO mischief in Eastern Europe and lessen U.S. inhibitions against intervention in an East European crisis like the one which has occurred most recently in Poland." The Soviets have argued, however, that any strikes against Soviet territory, even from European-based missiles, would prompt an immediate strategic response against the United States. They seem much more concerned about the first-strike potential of the new U.S. INF in itself, rather than the tenuous threat that the new capabilities would lead to NATO interference in Eastern Europe.

Jones' most thorough and original research and his strongest arguments concern the means by which the Sovi-



The Warsaw Pact's Fitter B fighter.





The Warsaw Pact's BMD mechanized combat infantry vehicle.

ets influence the doctrine and command appointments of the East European armies through the military-administrative, political, and educational institutions of the Warsaw Pact. Here one finds the most convincing evidence that the Soviets are actively trying to prevent the Eastern European armies from being able to defend their own national terri-

tories from a Soviet-led WTO invasion. They do so by denying Eastern European officers exposure to doctrines of territorial defense, and by allowing only officers supportive of Soviet military policies (graduates of Soviet military academies) to enter the WTO hierarchy.

Christopher Jones has made a major contribution to the current military debate in drawing attention to the fact that the Warsaw Pact has traditionally been used, and seems intended to be used, to keep Eastern Europe under Soviet control rather than to invade Western Europe. It is not so clear that Soviet nuclear weapons policies are as closely linked to a Soviet preoccupation with Eastern Europe. They may be better understood as responses to U.S. and NATO policies. These reservations aside, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe* represents probably the most important study of the Warsaw Pact to appear in over a decade. Its arguments should be widely read, understood, and debated.

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