Paradoxes of Violence and Self-determination

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ABSTRACT   Secessionist movements aspiring to statehood often resort to force if their demands are not met peacefully. Indeed a political community's ability to maintain internal order and external defence by military means is a fundamental attribute of the nation-state. Yet international law limits the use of force to self-defence. Is non-violent secessionism, then, an oxymoron, and violent secessionism illegal? The late twentieth-century witnessed successful cases of non-violent secession—along with nearly successful ones, ones whose success we might now judge to have been short-lived, ones whose commitment to non-violence was short-lived, and ones whose efforts provoked massacres and foreign intervention. This essay reviews examples of each to identify paradoxes that emerge when movements for national self-determination depend on violence for their success. It does so in the context of Just War Theory, and particularly Michael Walzer's influential formulation.

Introduction

Movements for secession typically originate in non-violent political activity, including petitions to the existing state for greater autonomy of the local political community. If that community perceives itself as a separate nation, it may harbour ambitions for full independence, establishment of its own nation-state, and control over its economic resources. If peaceful petitions for autonomy are met with violent repression on the part of state authorities, the embattled community is likely to be reinforced in its sense of nationhood—intense threat can produce a homogenizing effect, forcing people for safety's sake to give priority to their 'national' identity over all others—and further convinced that coexistence in a single state with its oppressors is impossible. It will seek to arm itself and attract outside support for its cause of self-determination and national independence. The nation's fate at that point becomes a test of arms.

In the twenty-first century, such a situation seems paradoxical. In the interest of survival, movements for self-determination and statehood forsake values that the existing community of states and international organizations claim to uphold: diversity, cosmopolitanism, peace, freedom of trade, and investment. The sometimes-competing values of self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of states have long coexisted uneasily. Both are enshrined in

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the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter also simultaneously prohibits states' use or threat of force (Article 2) and recognizes a state's 'inherent right' of self-defence in response to armed attack (Article 51). If a secessionist movement aspires to statehood, can it also anticipate its future obligation as a state and refrain from the use of force? In other words, is there a viable non-violent route for a distinct political community that seeks independent statehood?

A related paradox applies to the economic aspirations of political communities that seek the status of independent states. Secessionists are often driven by economic concerns. A region may consider secession because it is relatively rich and resents the transfer of its wealth to poorer areas of the country (e.g. Slovenia, Catalonia, the Northern League of Italy, and Tatarstan in the Russian Federation). Or a poor region with resources such as oil may consider itself exploited by the central government and seek greater autonomy or independence (Chiapas in Mexico, Chechnya in Russia, the Ogoni and Ijaw movements of the Niger Delta in Nigeria, or the earlier Biafra secession). Yet, in the twenty-first century, regions that seek independence in order to secure greater control over their economic resources face a globalized world characterized by a neoliberal ideology that rejects national control in favour of foreign investors' rights and free trade.

This essay investigates this basic paradox—that secessionist movements aspiring to nation-state status adopt measures seemingly in conflict with the values of the international system they seek to join. It does so in the context of Just War Theory, and, particularly Michael Walzer's influential formulation, dating to the late 1970s. By and large, just war theorists have not devoted much attention to the moral status of violence in the service of secession and this brief essay cannot do justice to the subject. Instead, it seeks to raise issues, in the form of a series of related paradoxes or contradictions that could form the basis for further exploration.

Non-violent Secession: An Oxymoron?

Michael Walzer, in his celebrated *Just and unjust wars*, devoted just a few pages each to 'Self-Determination and Self-Help', 'Secession', and 'Humanitarian Intervention' (Walzer, 1977). But he adduced an important point. Drawing on an 1859 article by John Stuart Mill, Walzer analogizes the political community to an individual. 'The members of a political community must seek their own freedom, just as the individual must cultivate his own virtue.' Both the individual and the political community must do so on their own, according to the principle of self-help: Members of the political community

> cannot be set free, as [the individual] cannot be made virtuous, by any external force. Indeed, political freedom depends upon the existence of individual virtue, and this the armies of another state are most unlikely to produce—unless, perhaps, they inspire an active resistance and set in motion a self-determining politics. (Walzer, 1977, p. 87)

Walzer's book is mainly a study of the ethics of war and he typically seeks to render normative judgments—self-help is how nations *ought* to achieve independence. They *should not* receive outside help in the form of another state's army intervening on their behalf, because that violates the norm against military intervention except in self-defence.

Self-determination, then, is the right of a people 'to become free by their own efforts', if they can, and non-intervention is the principle guaranteeing that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an alien power. It is to be stressed that there is no right to be protected against the consequences of domestic failure, even against a bloody repression. (Walzer, 1977, p. 88)

Only when the principle of non-intervention has already been violated by another state, acting militarily on behalf of the oppressor, of if the oppressor is carrying out widespread massacres of civilians, is it permissible, according to Walzer, for the insurgent nationalists to receive the assistance of armed intervention from abroad—but the nationalist uprising could still well fail.

For an author whose normative study opens with a chapter called 'Against realism', Walzer's account accords remarkably well with basic realist premises—the centrality of territorial sovereignty and the priority of military force to defend it. It also fits the assumptions of the international legal order, an order founded on the right and the duty of its member states to maintain order on their territory and to defend their sovereignty with military means. During the American Civil War, the question arose for Great Britain regarding the status of the Confederacy and whether its fighters would enjoy the rights of belligerency (not least, to be taken prisoner upon capture rather than executed on the spot). As an analysis in *The New York Times* put it at the time, 'when an insurrection had reached a certain height the insurgents were entitled to be treated as belligerents'. Yet, speaking from the standpoint of the Union, the author continues: 'War admits nothing. By war we dispute the claim of the rebels; we can do so in no other way. And the question is to be determined by force of arms, and not by legal puerilities' (York, 1861).

For Walzer, as for most international legal experts, a non-violent movement for national self-determination and independence, if not an oxymoron in itself, at least contains the seeds of its own failure. For 'a legitimate government is one that can fight its own internal wars' (Walzer, 1977, p.101) and should be capable of suppressing a non-violent secessionist campaign. 'The problem with a secessionist movement', argues Walzer, 'is that one cannot be sure that it in fact represents a distinct community until it has rallied its own people and made some headway in the "arduous struggle" for freedom' (Walzer, 1977, p. 93)—typically by violent means.

As a practical matter, if state-making—the creation of viable institutions of governance—still depends, as Tilly (1985) argued, on war-making, then newly independent states emerging through non-violent processes might face difficulties, even—or especially—in a benign security environment. Much depends on the internal coherence of the 'nation' (Taylor & Botea, 2008)—the identity of which is often forged under threat of violence. This point too found early expression in the US Civil War, as when John Russell, the British foreign minister, argued of the Confederacy that 'in order to be entitled to a place among the independent nations of the earth, a State ought to have not only strength and resources for a time, but afford promise of stability and permanence' (Russell, 1861; see also Walker, 1937).

Against such positive and normative expectations, the late twentieth century nevertheless witnessed successful cases of non-violent secession—along with nearly successful ones, ones whose success we might now judge to have been short-lived, ones whose

commitment to non-violence was short-lived, and ones whose efforts provoked massacres and foreign intervention. This essay reviews examples of each to identify paradoxes that emerge when movements for national self-determination depend on violence for their success.

Non-violent Secession Succeeds

The most dramatic example of non-violent secession occurred with the largely peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. It came about when the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met to declare the withdrawal of these three Slavic republics from the USSR and the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States. The key figure in the decision was Boris Yeltsin, the first elected president of Russia. He sought to undermine Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union, and his efforts to transform the USSR into a decentralized confederation. The secession of Russia—with its capital in Moscow, its 11 time zones, stretching from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, and its 50% of the Soviet population—made any plan for a post-Soviet confederation on Gorbachev's terms unviable. Gorbachev took the hint, resigned his post, and dissolved the USSR in a ceremony on 26 December that Yeltsin exploited for maximum humiliation of his erstwhile rival.[1]

Although the Soviet authorities had on occasion used force to resist nationalist movements during the Gorbachev reform era—in the Baltic republics and in Georgia, most notably—the break-up of the USSR occurred without major violence. In effect, all 15 of its constituent republics seceded peacefully from the Soviet Union. Disputed borders and claims of self-determination did lead to violence later, including a costly civil war in Tajikistan, irredentist conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and two brutal wars to suppress an armed Chechen independence movement. Yet, none of the republics of the Soviet Union had to fight for their freedom in the sense that Mill or Walzer anticipated.

The break-up of post-communist Czechoslovakia was even more peaceful, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia agreed to go their separate ways in 1993. Facing a benign security environment, and eventual membership in the world's most powerful military alliance, neither country has yet needed to test its ability to defend its territorial sovereignty.

Violent Secession Succeeds by Genocidal Means

The demise of federal Yugoslavia reflected a very different situation. Asserting autonomy against a government they viewed as increasingly dominated by Serb nationalists, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June 1991. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) attacked Slovenia, but—with a largely homogeneous population and few Serb residents—the newly independent country was of little interest to the Serb leader, Slobodan Milošević, so the conflict ended quickly. The war in Croatia was longer and more brutal, as Yugoslav army regulars and paramilitaries intervened ostensibly on behalf of the large population of Serbs living in the Krajina region and Croatian nationalists carried out policies of violent ethnic cleansing there.

Multi-ethnic Bosnia was the main victim of the break-up of Yugoslavia, as some of the most extreme nationalists favoured extermination of the Muslim population and partition of the territory between Croatia and Serbia. 'Ethnicity' in Bosnia and Herzegovina—where members of all three communities spoke roughly the same dialect of Serbo-Croatian,

enjoyed similar cuisine, and intermarried with members of the other groups, especially in the cosmopolitan capital of Sarajevo and in Tuzla[2]—was ostensibly based on religious adherence. Yet, even here, the differences were more apparent than real, given the high numbers of non-believers. According to a 1990 census, Bosnia's Muslims made up 43.7% of the population, Serbs 31%, and Croats 17.3%. Yet, when asked their religious belief, the proportions responding with the expected answers—Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Roman Catholicism—were only 16.5%, 20%, and 15%, respectively (Evangelista, 2011, p. 87). Gagnon explains this particular paradox of violent self-determination: 'the worst violence in the Yugoslav wars occurred in the most ethnically mixed and tolerant regions ... horrible levels of violence and atrocities were the only way to construct and impose new "clear" borders of ethnicity', intended to form the basis for new nation-states (Gagnon, 2004, p. 40). Although this generalization does not apply to all inter-ethnic conflicts, it has wide applicability, including, for example, to the conflict that broke out in Ukraine in 2013–2014. There the supposed ethnic divide was a linguistic one between Russian and Ukrainian, even though millions of people speak both languages—with some self-defined Ukrainian nationalists speaking Russian better than Ukrainian—and millions speak a mix of the two, known as *Surzhyk* (Pomerantsev, 2014).

In terms of the Mill–Walzer framework or Russell's criteria, the Bosnian political community at the break-up of Yugoslavia was not sufficiently coherent to earn its right to self-determination. It was still multinational, even after the defection of Serb and Croat nationalists, and, most importantly, it could not defend itself. Once Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation, the residents of Bosnia loyal to the government led by Alija Izetbegović were left, in Mark Danner's words, with a stark choice:

> either passively sink into a reconfigured Yugoslavia dominated by Milošević and the Serbs, or declare independence and pray that the world would recognize the new country and somehow protect it from the onslaught to come. Izetbegović chose the latter, imploring the 'international community' to recognize his new country and to send United Nations monitors to patrol its territory and prevent the war he knew would come. After a referendum on independence was duly held in February 1992 (which the Bosnian Serbs boycotted), the 'international community' in early April recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state, and gave it a seat at the United Nations. (Danner, 1997)

The self-styled realists of the US administration of George H.W. Bush had no interest in sending troops as peacekeepers to defend Bosnia. Self-help is a basic principle of the international system (even if Bush made an exception for oil-rich Kuwait). The cruel irony of the Bush policy, however, was that it did not allow Bosnia to assert its independence by armed defence: the USA enforced an arms embargo against all of the states of former Yugoslavia, after the Serb-dominated JNA had seized most of the weapons supplies in Bosnia and ensured that the Bosnians would be consistently out-gunned.

Izetbegović was no pacifist. David Rieff exaggerates when he reports that the Bosnian leader 'insisted there could be no war because one side—his own—would not fight' (quoted in Danner, 1997). Yet, he does capture a key feature of the war: it more often pitted armed men against unarmed civilians than against other armies. In any case, it was naïve (or a cynical gamble) for Izetbegović to have assumed that international recognition of Bosnian independence would imply external armed intervention to defend his

new state. As the Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić put it, quoting his patron Slobodan Milošević, 'Caligula proclaimed his horse a senator but the horse never took his seat. Izetbegović may get recognition but he'll never have a state'. For his own part, Karadžić warned Izetbegović, 'you'll drag Bosnia down to hell. You Muslims aren't ready for war—you'll face extinction' (quoted in Danner, 1997).

Non-violent Secession Fails, External Violence Prevails, At Least Provisionally

In the case of Kosovo, we observe a paradox of non-violent secessionism as well as inadequate self-help. Under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, promoted by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, two provinces of Serbia were accorded autonomous status based on their large populations of ethnic minorities—Kosovo, with its Albanian majority, and Vojvodina, with a large Hungarian minority and many other groups. During its period of autonomy, Kosovo's Albanians took advantage of their new rights to create institutions of self-government and control of the economy at the expense of the Serb minority. Many Serbs suffered persecution and violence and fled the province. As communism became increasingly discredited during the reform era initiated by Gorbachev, Slobodan Milošević, the Yugoslav communist leader, found a new source of support in Serb nationalism. As Christopher Hitchens put it, Milošević 'was able to don the mantle of racial and populist demagogue' and effect 'a quick-change from Balkan Stalinism to Balkan national socialism' (1999). He seized on the plight of Kosovo Serbs to accuse the Albanians of genocide and in 1989, he revoked the province's autonomous status and closed Albanian institutions, including the university. At that point, Albanian activists, led by a literary scholar, Ibrahim Rugova, formed a political party to pursue independence, and in 1992 founded the unrecognized Republic of Kosovo. Rugova was elected president. The Kosovo independence movement was committed to non-violent struggle and established a functional system of parallel governing and educational institutions. Despite Rugova's entreaties, the movement was ignored by the United States and its European allies. Even as Milošević violently repressed the non-violent Kosovar activists, the Western powers accepted his claim that Kosovo was a purely internal Serbian matter. Richard Holbrooke and his US State Department colleagues agreed, for example, not to put Kosovo on the agenda for the 1995 Dayton peace talks that ended the war in Bosnia. Rugova's non-violent movement illustrates the dim prospects for an unarmed struggle for self-determination in the face of ruthless repression and in the absence of external support.

Only when the Kosovo independence movement became violent did it attract US attention. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group that the State Department had earlier deemed a terrorist organization, carried out bombings and assassinations in a successful effort to provoke a violent response from Serbian authorities. Serb violence in turn provoked a refugee crisis. Although Rugova was re-elected president of the Republic of Kosovo, the thugs and criminals of the KLA were increasingly calling the tune. Whereas during the Bosnian war, the Bush administration had avoided even using the term 'genocide' to describe the widespread massacres, this time the Clinton administration was primed to fear the worst.

Reports of tens of thousands massacred and hundreds of thousands made refugees—combined with remorse for having failed to respond to the earlier atrocities in Bosnia (not to mention the Rwandan genocide) prompted the USA and its European allies to launch the first war in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March

1999. The 79-day campaign of aerial bombardment attacked not only Serb army and paramilitary forces in Kosovo, but hundreds of targets in Serbia proper, including bridges and rail facilities, and many buildings in Belgrade and other cities (among them, Nis and Novi Sad, centres of strong opposition to the rule of Milošević). The reports of massacres and the numbers of refugees expelled prior to March 1999 turned out to have been exaggerated (as elsewhere in the Yugoslav conflicts), but the air war itself caused an unprecedented refugee crisis, as over 800,000 Kosovar Albanians fled to neighbouring Macedonia and Albania (Danner, 1999).

Acting in effect as the KLA's air force, NATO succeeded in securing the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, without, apparently, having given much thought as to what comes next (Hitchens, 1999). NATO intervention did not receive authorization from the United Nations Security Council, as two permanent members—Russia and China—remained opposed. Supporters of that intervention, and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq, made the creative argument that 'although formally illegal', the NATO war against Serbia 'was nonetheless legitimate in the eyes of the international community'—which evidently did not include Russia or China (Slaughter, 2003). Lending some support to the claim of *post hoc* legitimation (as later with Iraq), both the European Union and the United Nations became involved in post-war reconstruction and governance of Kosovo (Skendaj, 2014). Kosovo took matters into its own hands in 2008 and issued a declaration of independence. By 2015, some 57% of UN members had recognized its status, but many prominent countries had not done so, including Russia, China, and the European Union members Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. Perhaps most significantly, Serbia did not recognize Kosovo's independence. Lacking NATO membership, with only a nascent security force possessing light weapons, how would Kosovo cope with a potentially irredentist future Serbia?

Non-violent Secession Eventually Fails

The example of Ukraine provides a possible answer: poorly. Following the peaceful demise of the USSR, Ukraine received some of the military resources of the former Soviet armed forces, including part of the Black Sea fleet, based in Crimea and various written commitments from Russia on the inviolability of its borders (the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, for example, not to mention the UN Charter). But when popular protest and violence forced Ukraine's pro-Russian president from office in February 2014, the country's military resources proved inadequate to cope with Russia's reaction: a mix of subversion and military invasion carried out by Russian troops and local insurgents, resulting in annexation of the Crimean peninsula and instability in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russia had carried out a similar action in 2008 in a war against post-Soviet Georgia that dashed Georgia's efforts to regain its two secessionist regions—South Ossetia and Abkhazia—and resulted in Russia's recognition of them as independent states. Russia invoked Kosovo's independence as a precedent—defying US claims that the Kosovo case was *sui generis*.

To a considerable degree, the seeds of violence and instability in the former Soviet space were sown even during the otherwise peaceful break-up of the USSR. The legacy of Soviet nationality policy and the fact that new international boundaries did not coincide with ethno national divisions—as in much of the postcolonial world—contributed to considerable, if localized, violence even in the relatively stable international environment

following the end of the Cold War (Evangelista, 1996). As relations between Russia and the NATO allies deteriorated, the weak states caught between Russia and the European Union or China (in the case of Kazakhstan) came under pressure, exposing the paradoxes of violence and self-determination.

Humanitarian Intervention

The failure of violence to defend secession and self-determination poses the risk of extinction—not only of the state itself, as in the case of Ukraine, but of its citizens as well, as Karadžić threatened the Muslims of Bosnia. Armed secessionist groups, from the Kosovar Albanians to the Tamils of Sri Lanka to the Kurds of Turkey or Iraq, have often faced a militarily stronger central state determined to thwart their aspirations for self-determination and willing to employ genocidal brutality to do so. The consequent massacres, if they are adequately publicized, lead to calls for external military assistance—'humanitarian intervention'. Mill wrote about it in 1859. Walzer wrote about it in 1977 and devoted much of each preface of the subsequent editions of *Just and unjust wars* to the topic. He argued in the 3rd edition (1999) that 'in recent years, there have almost certainly been more justified unilateral interventions than unjustified ones', and he revised his criteria for identifying legitimate invaders. Whereas it used to be 'their readiness to leave once the military victory is won and the massacres and ethnic cleansing are stopped', he claimed that 'the "in and out" test looks less reliable a quarter century later'. In the 4th edition (2006), Walzer was obliged to address the abuse of the humanitarian justification by the administration of George W. Bush and the possibility that neither a quick departure nor a long stay can sustain a regime dependent on foreigners for its survival—a thorny topic, full of its own paradoxes, that other scholars have treated well (Darden & Mylonas, 2012).

As Walzer's post-1977 writings reinforce, his emphasis on sovereign states' right and obligation to repress internal rebellion by force, if necessary, does not constitute a preference for violence. The pendulum has been swinging in the other direction, with scholars of Just War Theory and legal specialists emphasizing a state's 'responsibility to protect' its citizens from violence, and the right or obligation of third parties to intervene if states fail to fulfil that responsibility. By the year 2000, we heard Kofi Annan, the former secretary-general of the United Nations, express the view that 'emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities, which will and must take precedence over concerns of state sovereignty'. In defending the position that protection of minorities should rank higher in the scale of values than state sovereignty, Annan made explicit reference to the 'vicious and systematic campaign of "ethnic cleansing" conducted by Serbian authorities in Kosovo' (Annan, 2000). He did not mention that the campaign only ended with NATO's military intervention—an action that was technically illegal, given that it did not receive authorization from the UN Security Council.

Conclusion

To claim that the relationship between secession and violence is a paradoxical one is not to suggest that non-violent secession is an impossibility. The province of Québec, for example, after a brief experiment in secessionist violence and terrorism ended with mass arrests in October 1970, pursued the goal of 'sovereignty' from Canada through

peaceful means, by popular referenda. In 1995, the No vote won by the narrowest of margins—50.58 to 49.42% (Evangelista, 2011, p. 239). In a benign security environment, one could imagine other regions successfully pursuing secession peacefully at the ballot box. Scotland came close in 2014, and Catalonia aspires to do so—although against Spanish government resistance.

Yet, even if security concerns were removed from the picture, other issues complicate the process of pursuing self-determination in the form of independent statehood. And those issues—economic ones, for example—also evince a paradoxical character. Secessionists typically argue that their region is exploited economically by the centre and that they would be better off independent, with local control of their resources. Both rich and poor regions make such arguments. So the Chechen independence leader, Dzhokhar Dudaev, for example, claimed that an autonomous Chechnya, with its vast oil-refining industry, could become another Kuwait (Abubakarov, 1998), much as the Nigerian activist Ken Saro-wiwa imagined that greater autonomy for his native Ogoniland would yield revenue from the oil resources that were despoiling his land without even providing electricity for the inhabitants. Yet, as studies of an independent Québec's economic prospects suggested, control of local resources is an anachronistic dream in a world of globalized finance, neoliberal monetary policy, and the privatization of practically everything (Épinette, 1998; Lefebvre, 1998). So the economic paradox of secessionism contrasts the desires of the separatists for self-determination in the management of their resources with the reality of a globalized market economy. Kofi Annan acknowledged this point in a backhanded way when he decried the traditional 'anything goes' understandings of sovereignty:

> In a world where globalization has limited the ability of states to control their economies, regulate their financial policies, and isolate themselves from environmental damage and human migration, the last right of states cannot and must not be the right to enslave, persecute or torture their own citizens. (Annan, 2000)

The final paradox of secessionism addressed here links the security and the economic dimensions. Secessionist wars—a species of the 'new wars' described by Kaldor (1999)—prove lucrative for black marketeers who often fund and lead them. When the security environment is too dangerous for conventional business transactions, especially under siege conditions, separatist warlords can control local resources in a way that would be impossible during peacetime (Andreas, 2008 for the case of Sarajevo). Paradoxically, then, prolonging the violence is more profitable for some separatist leaders than actually achieving the goal of independence. And when those leaders fail to deliver a more peaceful and prosperous life to the constituents who placed their hopes in independence, they often seek to divert attention by scapegoating and targeting for violence the minorities who remained in the newly independent 'national' territory—potentially unleashing another cycle of separatist violence and external intervention. The barriers to successful secession, whether achieved peacefully or through violence, appear formidable in the face of such paradoxes.

Notes

1. A reviewer has suggested that the break-up of the USSR was less a case of secession than of 'consensual state dissolution'. But the alacrity with which Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan sought to join the new

entity formed by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the fact that more than three-quarters of Soviet participants in a March 1991 referendum had voted to maintain a federation among the republics, suggest that the preference for dissolution was far from consensual.

2. In 1981, 15.8% of children in Bosnia and Herzegovina were products of mixed marriages, and 16.8% of marriages registered in that year were mixed (Gagnon, 2004, pp. 41–42). An earlier study showed lower rates for the republic, with averages between 11% and 12% from the 1960s through the 1980s, slightly lower than for Yugoslavia as a whole (Botev, 1994, p. 469). These figures do not take account, however, of people who self-identified with the supranational category 'Yugoslav'. In 1990, 25% of those polled in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed this pan-Yugoslav identity, with young people at 33% (Gagnon, 2004, p. 41).

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